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Note
I'M PAYING FOR THAT?-ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF MANDATING STUDENT ACTIVITY FEES TO SUPPORT
OBJECTIONABLE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
ACTIVITIES AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
IN SOUTHWORTH v. GREBE
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, student activity fees fund a diverse group of organizations to
accommodate students' varied interests and to promote the expression of
diverse viewpoints.' In addition to providing financial support, universi-
ties have fostered such ambitious goals by encouraging the creation of new
campus organizations. 2 Where there was once only the glee club, march-
ing band and student council, today there exists an overwhelming array of
student groups numbering into the hundreds.3 To fund the growing
collection of campus groups, universities have resorted to assessing
mandatory student activity fees, amounting at times to several hundred
dollars per year.4 Although courts have permitted State Regents to collect
1. For a discussion of the various groups sponsored by today's universities, see
infra note 22 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of the promotion of the marketplace of ideas at today's
universities, see infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
3. See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 185 (1993)
(stating that Associated Students of University of California at Berkeley currently
funds 150 recognized groups). The University of Wisconsin funds over 200 stu-
dent groups and services. See Anne-Marie Cusac, Suing ForJesus: A New Legal Team
Wants to Cleanse the Campuses For Christ (Alliance Defense Fund), THE PROGRESSlVE,
Apr. 1, 1997, at 30 (discussing breadth of student groups and services that 39,826
University of Wisconsin Madison students funded during 1996-97 academic year).
4. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that, at
time of suit brought against University of Wisconsin Regents, students paid
mandatory student fee of $165.75 per semester), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1332
(1999). Revenues and student activity fees have not always been as high as those
collected today. See Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1974)
(noting that between 1970 and 1972, University of North Carolina charged under-
graduate students $9 per semester, graduate and professional students $7 per se-
mester and summer school students $3 per semester, totaling in excess of $250,000
per year); Larson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 204 N.W.2d 568, 570
(Neb. 1973) (assessing University of Nebraska student fee of $51.50 per semester
in 1971); Lace v. University of Vt., 303 A.2d 475, 476 (Vt. 1973) (assessing Univer-
sity of Vermont student fee of $21.50 per semester).
In contrast, State University of New York (SUNY) Albany gave $57,600 to the
New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG) fund in 1992 (at $3 per
student), adding to the $2.7 million NYPIRG annual budget, roughly 30% of which
came from student activity fees across New York State. See Carroll v. Blinken, 957
(257)
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mandatory student activity fees, the constitutionality of using those fees to
fund private organizations remains unsettled.5 Recently, in Southworth v.
Grebe,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that it is unconstitutional for mandatory student fees to fund organizations
engaged in political or ideological advocacy or speech.
7
This Note addresses the limited question as posed in Southworth and
demonstrates how it fits into the larger body of First Amendment jurispru-
dence involving compelled funding. In Part II, this Note delineates the
constitutional and statutory sources by which State Regents obtain the
power to collect and disseminate mandatory student activity fees.8 Part II
also discusses the limitations on the allocation of fee revenues by using the
United States Supreme Court's labor union and integrated bar dues para-
digm as it pertains to collection and dissemination of mandatory student
activity fees.9 In addition, Part II addresses the appropriateness of using
the union fees and integrated bar dues paradigm set forth most succinctly
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education1 ° and Keller v. State Bar of California."
Part III recounts the facts and procedural history of Southworth, in which
the Seventh Circuit enjoined the Wisconsin State Regents from using the
allocable portion of objecting students' mandatory student activity fees to
fund controversial organizations. 12 Part IV sets forth and critically ana-
lyzes the court's reasoning, particularly focusing on the propriety of its
reliance on the Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n13 analysis. 14 Part IV also ad-
dresses the adequacy of the court's equitable remedy and the potential
obstacles to its enforcement.' 5 Finally, Part V discusses the possible legal
F.2d 991, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing student activity fees used to fund
NYPIRG).
5. For a further discussion of the constitutionality of using mandatory student
activity fees to fund private organizations, see infra notes 119-75 and accompanying
text. For a further discussion of the Regents' role in allocating student activity
fees, see infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
6. 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999).
7. For a discussion of the court's holding in Southworth, see infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the constitutional and statutory sources by which State
Regents obtain the power to collect and disseminate mandatory student activity
fees, see infra notes 17-48 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the labor union and integrated bar dues paradigm, see
infra notes 49-90 and accompanying text.
10. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
11. 496 U.S. 1 (1990). For a discussion of the use of the union dues and
integrated bar fees paradigm in mandatory student activity fee cases, see infra
notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts of Southworth, see infra notes 106-18 and ac-
companying text.
13. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
14. For a discussion and critique of the court's reasoning in Southworth, see
infta notes 119-40, 149-75 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the adequacy of the Southworth court's equitable rem-
edy, see infra notes 141-48, 173-75 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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and social ramifications that may result from permitting objecting stu-




A. Rationale for Permitting the Collection of Mandatory
Student Activity Fees-The Pre-Abood Years
1. The Balancing Test
State legislatures typically delegate to State Regents the authority to
allocate student activity fees. 17 States such as Kansas and Texas delegate
almost unlimited power to the Regents for assessing and allocating fees.'
8
In contrast, states like Oklahoma exercise more control over the Regents'
role in collecting and disseminating student activity fees.' 9
16. For a discussion of the possible impact of the Southworth decision, see infra
notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
17. SeeAAsKA STAT. § 14.40.170(b) (3) (Michie 1997) ("The Board of Regents
may... set student tuition and fees."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.235(1) (West 1998)
("Each University is authorized to establish separate activity and service ... fees.
When duly established, the fees shall be collected as component parts of the regis-
tration and tuition fees and shall be retained by the university and paid into the
separate activity ... funds."); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-8.6(a) (Michie 1997)
(establishing University of Hawaii student activities revolving fund); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 262.34B(2)-(3) (West 1996) ("The student fee committee shall consider
any proposed student activity changes at the university and shall make recommen-
dations concerning student activity fee changes to the president of the affected
university.... The state board of regents shall make the final decision on student
activity fee changes."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-719 (1997) ("[T]he board of regents
shall fix tuition, fees and charges to be collected by each state educational institu-
tion. If a state educational institution collects a student-activity fee, the funds so
collected shall be set apart and used for the purpose of supporting appropriate
student activities."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3218.12(A)-(G) (West 1998) (per-
mitting Oklahoma State System of Higher Education to set and waive student activ-
ity fees within guidelines set forth by state legislature); TEX. EBUc. CODE ANN.
§ 54.5061 (West 1996) (establishing Board of Regents' power to assess voluntary or
compulsory student activity fees and enumerating allocation system by which indi-
vidual universities may disseminate such fees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.15.041
(West 1997) (establishing Board of Regents' power to collect student activity fees
within Washington State University system).
18. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-717 (1997) (permitting Board of Regents to col-
lect student activity fees subject only to statute); id. § 76-742 (1997) (stating stu-
dent fees may not be used to fund debt services on academic or health facilities
absent student referendum); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.5061 (West 1996) (per-
mitting Board of Regents to collect both voluntary and compulsory student activity
fees if fees are reasonable and used solely for supporting student services); see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. City of Santa Monica, 143 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279-80 (Ct.
App. 1978) (finding that California Constitution expressly delegates to Regents
full powers of organization and government over University of California, thus
granting Regents "virtual autonomy in self-governance").
19. See OKi-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3218.12(A)-(G) (West 1998) (subjecting
students enrolled in Oklahoma State System of Higher Education to payment of
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Generally speaking, once the student activity fees are collected, uni-
versities divide the funds raised into monies to be allocated by the students
and those to be allocated by the university itself.2 0 Fees collected by the
university tend to support student extracurricular activities and infrastruc-
ture, such as buildings, salaries of deans and general administrative
funds. 21 Monies allocated by students, the area most susceptible to consti-
tutional challenge, lend financial support to the plethora of organizations
recognized by the university. 22 Students have almost exclusive control
over such monies, subject only to administrative oversight.
2 3
Early rationale for permitting the collection of mandatory fees at pub-
lic colleges and universities focused on the educational value of supple-
menting formal curricular activities. 24 Courts deciding fee cases routinely
20. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
that while students review and make recommendations regarding use of nonallo-
cable fees, Regents control final distribution of such fees), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct.
1332 (1999).
21. See id. ("The nonallocable fees cover expenses such as debt service, fixed
operating costs of auxiliary operations, student health services, and the first and
second year of the Recreational Sports budget."). Not all allocable student activity
fees fall directly under student control. See Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 993-94
(2d Cir. 1992) (noting that at SUNY Albany, NYPIRG and Student Association have
contractual agreement whereby $3 from each student's activity fee per semester,
totaling $57,600 per year, automatically goes to support statewide NYPIRG, subject
only to student referendum once every two years).
22. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720 (discussing variety of student groups
funded by allocable portion of student activity fees). For example, the 18 organiza-
tions in dispute in Southworth were: Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group
(WISPIRG); the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center; the Campus Women's
Center; the UW Greens; the Madison AIDS Support Network; the International
Socialist Organization; the Ten Percent Society; the Progressive Student Network;
Amnesty International; United States Student Association; Community Action on
Latin America; La Colectiva Cultural de Aztlan; the Militant Student Union of the
University of Wisconsin; the Student Labor Action Coalition; Student Solidarity;
Students of National Organization for Women; MADPAC; and Madison Treaty
Rights Support Group. See id. (enumerating organizations at source of
controversy).
Fees at SUNY Albany fund such diverse groups as the Irish Club; the Korean
Students Association; Dance, Theater and New Art Councils; the Black Alliance;
the Pan-Caribbean Association; a geography club; Fuerza Latina; the Feminist Alli-
ance; Amnesty International; the Revisionist Zionist Alternative; the Gay and Les-
bian Alliance; and NYPIRG. See Carroll, 957 F.2d at 993 (listing student
organizations at issue).
23. See Carroll, 957 F.2d at 993 (finding that once organization meets criteria
set forth by university, that organization must petition for funding and be selected
by SUNY Albany Student Association and then president's office must approve
funding); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (stating
that University of North Carolina Board of Governors has ultimate authority over
collection and allocation of funds collected from student activity fees with students
acting in advisory role).
24. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981) ("It is stated policy
of the University of Missouri at Kansas City to encourage the activities of student
organizations."); Carroll, 957 F.2d at 999 (finding that SUNY Albany's interest in
funding NYPIRG from student activity fees presents effort to"expand campus
[Vol. 44: p. 257260
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recognized the ability of student organizations to integrate classroom the-
ory with practical application, thus increasing learning opportunities for
students.2 5 Funding for such student groups frequently came from
speech by facilitating exposure to wide variety of speakers); Gay & Lesbian Stu-
dents Ass'n v. Cohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362, 367 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing Gay and
Lesbian Student Association as registered student organization, serving valid pur-
pose to campus as whole by educating people about homosexuality and providing
support group for homosexuals); Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1067 (3d Cir.
1985) (noting that "[t]here is room for argument that a university's role of
presenting a variety of ideas is a sufficiently compelling reason for some infringe-
ment of First Amendment rights"); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152
(D. Neb. 1973) (finding that by promoting extracurricular activities, University of
Nebraska Regents "embraced an educational philosophy that the education of stu-
dents extends beyond that which takes place in the classroom under the tutelage
of instructors and professors"); Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr.
2d 181, 201 (1993) (discussing how collection and disbursement of student fees
play integral part in university's educational mission "to combat orthodoxy by en-
couraging the dissemination of a multiplicity of views and interests, many of which
will inevitably provoke controversy, debate and opposition"); Larson v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 204 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Neb. 1973) (finding that Uni-
versity of Nebraska Regents had right to fund additional services and facilities that
.were essential to the creation of a better educational environment"); Good v. As-
sociated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 542 P.2d 762, 764 (Wash. 1975) (stating
that state statute permits University of Washington Regents to collect and dissemi-
nate student activity fees to fund student activities and programs as they see fit).
25. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 (finding that extracurricular activity in
public forum increases students' "social and cultural awareness as well as their in-
tellectual curiosity"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13
n.48 (1978) (noting president of Princeton University stated that "a great deal of
learning occurs informally. It occurs through interactions among students ... who
have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly
or indirectly, to learn from their differences"); Carroll, 957 F.2d at 1000-01 (quot-
ing President Vencent O'Leary of SUNY Albany, "[T]he activity fee 'create[s] a
forum for the expression of diverse views at Albany,"' which is "'consonant with
the educational mission' of the university"); Galda, 772 F.2d at 1062 (noting expert
testimony suporting mandatory student fee for Public Interest Research Group
(PIRG), because PIRGs benefit student body by providing leadership opportuni-
ties, research projects and other training in creating good citizens); Veed, 353 F.
Supp. at 152 ("[E]ducation of students extends beyond that which takes place in
the classroom under the tutelage of instructors and professors."); Larson, 204
N.W.2d at 570 (discussing University of Nebraska officials' right to create addi-
tional services from mandatory student fees to promote better educational envi-
ronment); Good, 542 P.2d at 768-69 (discussing campus-wide debate's positive
impact on students).
In addition, quoting a former chancellor of SUNY Albany, the Carroll court
stated:
The experience of a student on any campus extends beyond a classroom
experience. The basic philosophy of an educational experience in any
institution that I am familiar with is to provide for a student as wide a
range of opportunities and exposures which will allow for the develop-
ment of the potentials of an entire individual. I would stress the impor-
tance of [students] reaching out during their undergraduate years to
sample, to explore, to see various kinds of activities, because it is one of
the rare times in an individual's life when you have an opportunity to
learn a great deal more about different kinds of activities and events.
5
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mandatory student activity fees.26 As a general rule, courts tended to, and
continue to, defer to state statutes in upholding mandatory student activity
fees, thereby granting educational institutions broad authority in manag-
ing and controlling their internal affairs.
27
Over the years, the assessment and allocation of mandatory fees has
generated a number of legal challenges based on the violation of certain
First Amendment rights. 28 By forcing students to fund and associate with
programs that are objectionable to individual students, universities have
encroached upon students' rights of free speech and free association.
29
While recognizing the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech
Carroll, 957 F.2d at 999-1000. In total, activity fees support three interests: "[T]he
promotion of extracurricular life, the transmission of skills and civic duty, and the
stimulation of energetic campus debate." Id. at 1001.
26. See, e.g., Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 123-24 (5th Cir.
1992) (finding that Southwest Texas State University financial support for student-
run newspaper was "narrowly tailored means" of advancing educational ends); Car-
roll, 957 F.2d at 1001 (finding that SUNY Albany was not unique in using student
activity fees as means to nurture campus debate); Galda, 772 F.2d at 1066 (noting
valuable experience gained by participating in NewJersey Public Interest Research
Group (NJPIRG)); Arrington, 380 F. Supp. at 1363 (finding that funding of student-
run newspaper through mandatory student fees did not violate First Amendment);
Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 153 ("[A] university is not constitutionally prohibited from
financing through mandatory student fees programs which provide a forum for
expression of opinion."); Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 570 (discussing University of Ne-
braska officials' use of mandatory student fees to promote better educational envi-
ronment); Good, 542 P.2d at 768 (stating that universities are free to assess
mandatory fees, though allocation of those fees is subject to First Amendment
scrutiny).
27. See, e.g., Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (recognizing authority of
states and school officials to prescribe and control conduct in schools); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (recognizing
authority of states and school officials in prescribing and controlling conduct in
schools); Veed, 353 F. Supp at 152 (finding that determination of educational na-
ture of activities is left to individual Regents, subject only to First Amendment scru-
tiny); Smith, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186 (recognizing Regents' authority to levy student
activity fees as granted by California State Constitution); Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 571
(recognizing without question University of Nebraska's right to support partially
campus newspaper with student fees); Good, 542 P.2d at 764 (deferring to Washing-
ton State's higher education code to determine extent of Regents' power to allo-
cate student fees).
Many state statutes give broad authority to State Regents in collecting student
activity fees. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.170(b) (3) (Michie 1997) (providing
that "[t]he Board of Regents may... set student tuition and fees"). Not all states,
however, cast the language of their statutes in such permissively broad language.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.235(1)-(2) (West 1998) (directing State Regents to spell
out, with excruciating precision, manner of collection and distribution of student
activity fees).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances").
29. See IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948) ("[T]o
compel [an individual] to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.").
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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and freedom of the press, critics of mandatory student activity fees point
out two immutable corollaries to the First Amendment: (1) the right not
to speak3 0 and (2) the right not to be compelled to subsidize the speech of
others.
3 1
Courts have held that students' First Amendment rights are not aban-
doned with the donning of academic robes.32 In Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District,3 3 the Supreme Court firmly established
that the First Amendment safeguards: (1) the right to express one's polit-
ical beliefs; (2) the right not to be coerced into expressing or supporting
beliefs one disagrees with; and (3) the right not to be punished for one's
personal beliefs.
3 4
In 1972, the Supreme Court held that the Tinker analysis applies to
colleges and universities when it decided Healy v. James.3 5 The Healy Court
defined the academic community as "the college classroom with its sur-
30. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."). It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court ruling in Barnette
struck down a West Virginia law compelling public school students to salute and
pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag. See id. West Virginia enacted the law in the
midst of World War II, a time when public patriotism reached a fevered pitch. See
Jeff Homer, Student Fees and First Amendment Concerns, 120 WEST's EDUC. L. RFP.
911, 911 (1997) (noting that despite overwhelming public sentiment in favor of
compelled flag saluting, Supreme Court struck down law requiring flag saluting,
thus remaining steadfast in its protection of First Amendment liberties).
31. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 10 (1990) (holding that using
compulsory dues to finance objectionable political and ideological activities of
State Bar violates right to free speech guaranteed by First Amendment) (citing
BRANT, supra note 29, at 354); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36
(1977) (deciding that payers of union dues need not pay, nor be coerced into
paying, for advancement of ideas to which they object).
32. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 ("[S]tate colleges and universities are not en-
claves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment .... [Tihe precedents of
this Court leave no room for the view that... First Amendment protections should
apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.");
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate."); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protec-
tion of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.").
33. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
34. See id. at 505-06, 514 (reaffirming notion that "pure speech" is entitled to
comprehensive protection under First Amendment). The Court held that wearing
armbands "was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by
those participating in it" and is a form of pure speech protected under the Consti-
tution. See id. (holding that in absence of demonstrated facts that might reason-
ably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of, or material
interference with, school activities, prohibiting wearing of black armbands on stu-
dents' sleeves to protest Vietnam War presented unconstitutional denial of stu-
dents' right to free expression of opinion).
35. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
1999] NOTE
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rounding environs" where there exists a "marketplace of ideas," secured by
a nation dedicated to "safeguarding academic freedom."3 6 The Court
went on to hold that the First Amendment requires a balance between
student, faculty and administrator interests in promoting "an environment
free from disruptive interference with the educational process" and the
state's "equally significant interest" in providing "the widest latitude for
free expression and debate."37 Only if the speech poses a substantial im-
pediment to other students' opportunities to obtain their educations may
the university restrict students' First Amendment rights.
3 8
As stated above, the initial line of student activity fee cases strove to
balance students' First Amendment rights with a university's desire to fos-
ter a marketplace of ideas.39 These first cases, using a balancing test, sug-
gested that mandatory fees would withstand constitutional muster if "(1)
they are used to promote a college environment supportive of learning,
debate, dissent and controversy and (2) do not support any particular
political or personal philos'ophy."40 Such early cases held that universities
were not prohibited from using mandatory fees to finance programs that
provided a viewpoint-neutral forum for the expression of opinion. 41 Early
36. Id. at 180-81 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y.,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)
("Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evalu-
ate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stag-
nate and die."); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 63.0 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (advocating "free trade of ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"); Veed v.
Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Neb. 1973) (recognizing that University of
Nebraska has embraced educational philosophy that exposure to speakers outside
of classroom concerning widely divergent set of opinions provides important edu-
cational tool); Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 542 P.2d 762,
769 (Wash. 1975) (recognizing role of university in fostering dissemination of wide
range of ideas, theories and beliefs).
37. Healy, 408 U.S. at 171.
38. See id. at 184 (recognizing that colleges, while having legitimate interests
in preventing upheaval on campus, such as disruption of classes and infringement
of campus rules, have "heavy burden" in demonstrating appropriateness of restrict-
ing free speech); cf Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19
(1971) (finding that prior restraint of expression has heavy presumption against
constitutional validity); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (finding
heavy presumption against constitutional validity for prior restraints of expression
in exhibiting motion pictures); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931)
(finding statute authorizing restraint on certain publications to be inconsistent
with historical freedom of press).
39. See Maxine G. Schmitz, Mandatory Student Activity Fees in Public Colleges and
Universities: The Impact of Smith v. University of California, 25 J.L. & EDuc. 601, 606
(1996) (discussing first attempts by courts to grapple with issue of constitutional
rights with respect to mandatory student activity fees).
40. Id. at 606-07; see Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 152 ("Within wide limitations a state
is free to adopt such educational philosophy as it chooses."); Good, 542 P.2d at 764,
768 (upholding University of Wisconsin Regents' broad power to conduct its own
affairs).
41. See Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 152 (finding that so long as funding is not "arbi-
trary or capricious," university has vast latitude in allocating student activity fees).
264
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jurisprudence on the subject also acknowledged the potential damaging
effect of pro rata fee reimbursement on a university's educational mis-
sion. 42 In contrast, recent cases have downplayed the potential crippling
effect on free speech that would occur if students were permitted to with-
hold portions of their student activity fees that fund objectionable
causes.
43
Underlying the idea of the university as a marketplace of ideas is the
public forum doctrine.44 The Supreme Court in Perry Education Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators'Ass'n4 5 stated that the public forum doctrine pertains
to those domains held immemorially in the public trust.46 Courts have
The court clarified its statement by adding that the activities must not: (1) be cho-
sen in an arbitrary and capricious manner; (2) force students to accept or practice
religious, political or personal viewpoints offensive to them; or (3) have a chilling
effect on student exercise of constitutionally protected rights. See id. (setting forth
test in determining constitutionality of allocations).
42. See Good, 542 P.2d at 768-69 (arguing that permitting dissenters to with-
hold minimal financial contributions required by university "would permit a possi-
ble minority view to destroy or cripple a valuable learning adjunct of university
life").
43. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 725 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The mere
incantation of the rubric 'education' cannot overcome a tactic, repugnant to the
Constitution, of requiring objecting students to fund private political and ideologi-
cal organizations."), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999); Smith v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 184 (1993) (noting that Regents may continue
to fund student political activities, but only with fees from nonobjecting students);
see also Schmitz, supra note 39, at 601 (noting that Smith court failed to address idea
of university as forum for varying views, theories and beliefs); Carolyn Wiggin, A
Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory Student Fees to Support
Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009, 2009-10 (1994) (noting that
largely unnoticed Smith decision, in attempt to protect paradoxically First Amend-
ment rights, may in fact "severely diminish student speech on issues of public con-
cern at state universities"); Karen M. Kramer, Comment, The Free Rider Problem and
First Amendment Concerns: A Balance Upset by New Limitations on Mandatory Student
Fees, 21 J.C. & U.L. 691, 691-92 (1995) (noting that Smith merits close attention
because of its potentially far-reaching effect of "alter[ing] the climate of debate on
university campuses and ... limit[ing] student exposure to diverse extracurricular
activities that, in large part, define the college educational experience").
44. For a discussion of the public forum doctrine, see infra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
45. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
46. See id. at 45-47 (discussing different types of public forums). Two com-
mentators summarized the Perry analysis in the following manner:
"In a classic, or quintessential, public forum, such as a park or a sidewalk,
the Court strictly scrutinized a content-based regulation to see whether it
is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling governmental interest. The
Court also requires a compelling interest to justify any blanket prohibi-
tion of all speech. When the forum [often called a limited or designated
forum] is not a historic type of public forum, but has nonetheless been
opened to the public's first amendment activities, the Court again strictly
scrutinizes content regulation, but allows the government to close the fo-
rum entirely. Finally, in a nonpublic forum, the government is free to
exclude speech or speakers based upon the content of the message, ex-
cept in cases of viewpoint discrimination."
9
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traditionally found universities to operate limited public forums, an off-
shoot of traditional public forum jurisprudence. 47 As a limited public fo-
rum, a public university may use the campus in any manner consistent
with its mission as an educational institution dedicated to promoting a
marketplace of ideas.
48
2. Early Union Fees and Integrated Bar Dues Cases
Since the balancing test era, a second line of cases has emerged analo-
gizing mandatory student fees to union fees or integrated state bar associa-
tion dues. 49 Despite wide acceptance of the union dues and integrated
Robert L. Waring, Comment, Talk is Not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at Public Uni-
versities on Tria4 29 U.S.F. L. Rv. 541, 555 (1995) (quoting Daniel A. Farber &
John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in
First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. Rxv. 1219, 1220-21 (1984)).
47. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 263 (1981) (finding University of
Missouri to have created limited public forum open to activities sponsored by regis-
tered student groups). The Widmar Court recognized that:
First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special charac-
teristics of the school environment .... A university differs in significant
respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal
theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court
have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regula-
tions compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and
facilities.
Id. at 268 n.5 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
48. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 818-19
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding that, in limited public forum, there is
need to confine expressive activity on property to uses compatible with purposes of
operating institution); see also Waring, supra note 46, at 557 (noting that, while
remaining controversial subgroup, concept of limited public forum conforms with
concept of college campus as place to disseminate plethora of ideological and
political ideals).
49. See generally Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 123 (5th Cir.
1992) (extrapolating from Abood that "government may compel an individual to
subsidize non-governmental speech when such compulsion accomplishes the gov-
ernment's vital policy interest"); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 997-98 (2d Cir.
1992) (comparing mandatory nonunion member fees for funding objectionable
ideological activities and SUNY Albany's requirement of NYPIRG student fee);
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding Abood Court's
labor union analysis to be proper for assessing constitutionality of mandatory stu-
dent activity fees); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1983) (discuss-
ing efficacy of using Abood analysis in assessing validity of mandatory student
activity fees); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1360-62 (M.D.N.C. 1974)
(adopting integrated bar dues analysis found in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820
(1961), as analytical tool in assessing constitutionality of student activity fees); Lar-
son v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 204 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Neb. 1973)
(finding that while union dues cases present proper starting point in determining
constitutionality of student activity fees, there exist important distinctions between
activities of labor unions and extracurricular activities at universities); Lace v. Uni-
versity of Vt., 303 A.2d 475, 479 (Vt. 1973) (adopting International Ass'n of Machinist
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), union dues analysis as proper analytical tool for as-
sessing constitutionality of mandatory student activity fees).
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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bar fees paradigm, not all jurisdictions have adopted this model in assess-
ing the constitutionality of mandatory student activity fees, thus producing
a circuit split.5 0 In addition, unlike the pure balancing test cases that con-
sistently held in favor of the university, cases adopting the union fees and
integrated state bar association dues paradigm have not been as favorable
to the Regents in recent decisions.
5 1
In early attempts to analogize mandatory student activity fees and
union or state bar association dues, the courts relied on International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street52 and Lathrop v. Donohue.53 For example, in Larson v.
Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska,54 the Nebraska Supreme Court
distinguished between the political and economic activities supported by
union dues and those supported by mandatory student fees.5 5 Finding in
favor of the university, the court held that extracurricular activities are
"essential to the creation of a better educational environment" and that
50. For a further discussion of the circuit split concerning the application of
the union dues and integrated bar fees analysis, see infra notes 91-105 and accom-
panying text.
51. See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 214 (1993)
(upholding long line of jurisprudence permitting State Regents to impose
mandatory student activity fees while prohibiting Regents from using fees to com-
pel and coerce dissenting students to subsidize objectionable political and ideolog-
ical causes); see also Schmitz, supra note 39, at 645 (finding decision in Smith poorly
reasoned, contrary to settled law and susceptible to being overruled); Kramer,
supra note 43, at 691 (finding ruling in Smith to be new constitutional limitation on
university's use of mandatory student fees); Waring, supra note 46, at 541 (finding
Smith decision, with its "indifference to the principles of academic freedom threat-
ens the free exchange of ideas at public universities").
52. 367 U.S. 740 (1961); see Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,
736 (1988) (finding that Street Court's reasoning established that National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994), did not permit unions to use
objecting nonmember dues to fund activities unrelated to collective bargaining
activities, thereby preserving Congress' intent to authorize "compulsory unionism
only to the extent necessary to ensure that those who enjoy union negotiated bene-
fits contribute to their cost").
53. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). The Court raised two issues in Lathrop: (1) whether
compulsory membership in an integrated state bar association violates a person's
free association rights and (2) whether the requirement of paying mandatory bar
association dues and compelling a person to subscribe to opinions opposed to
their own violates a person's free speech rights. See id. at 822-23 (addressing consti-
tutionality of mandatory fees in state with integrated bar). The Court held that
compulsory membership requiring only the payment of annual dues did not vio-
late a person's constitutional free association rights. See id. at 827-28, 843. In addi-
tion, the Court deemed the free speech issue not ripe for consideration because
the plaintiff failed to allege specific positions and views that were taken by the bar
association which conflicted with the plaintiff's views. See id. at 847 (finding claim
not ripe for adjudication).
54. 204 N.W.2d 568 (Neb. 1973).
55. See id. at 570 ("There is an important distinction between the political
activities of a labor union and extracurricular activities at a university.").
11
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facilitating such an environment by use of mandatory fees was within the
school's discretionary authority.
56
Further efforts to analogize mandatory student fees and integrated
bar dues focused on the criteria set forth in Arrington v. Taylor.57 In adopt-
ing the criteria enumerated in Larson, the district court in Arrington deter-
mined that "[e] conomic capacity and First Amendment rights are [at best]
remotely related."58 Rather than viewing mandatory fees as eliminating
minority viewpoints by requiring students to support financially majority
viewpoints, the Arrington court found that mandatory fees were used to
provide a forum for all students to express their opinions.
59
Finally, the Arrington court compared student nonpayment with fail-
ure to pay taxes, stating that permitting "a taxpayer to refuse to pay that
portion of his taxes which is used for informational purposes would under-
mine the entire tax collection system." 60 In a recently decided case, Gay
& Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn,6 1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit recognized the merit of the taxpayer analogy in analyz-
ing student activity fee cases. 62 Although the analogy may prove helpful,
56. See id. at 570-71 (stating that "[w]ithin reasonable limits, it is appropriate
that many different points of view be presented to the students"). The court went
on to state that the mere fact that students disagreed with some of the views ex-
pressed was not controlling. See id. (finding disagreement with views expressed not
dispositive). Furthermore, exposing students to a variety of viewpoints, "within
reasonable limits" and with "reasonable supervision" by college officials, is neces-
sary in "promoting and permitting the reflection of a broad spectrum of university
life and reasonable representation of the various aspects of student thought and
action." Id. at 571.
57. 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974). The Arrington court adopted the fol-
lowing four out of five criteria set forth in Lathrop to determine whether the collec-
tion of mandatory student activity fees withstood constitutional challenge: (1)
whether the mandatory payment would "reduce a dissident member's economic
capacity to espouse causes in which he [or she] believes"; (2) whether such fees
could lead to the "governmental 'establishment' of political belief"; (3) whether
the increased power of the group collecting fees "could tend to 'drown out' the
voice of its dissenting members"; and (4) whether compelling "a person to pay
dues to an organization which espouses views contrary to [a person's] own in effect
compels [that person] to adopt and affirm those views." Id. at 1361 (citing Lathrop,
367 U.S. at 849-85 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
58. Id. at 1361-62. The court also noted that "[a]ny contention that the
mandatory fee exacted from the plaintiffs ... reduces their economic ability to
further their positions is unsupportable." Id.
59. See id. at 1362 (finding that such fees provide forum for those who write
for student-run paper to express their views).
60. Id. According to the court, "[T]he Daily Tar Heers position on a given sub-
ject is no more attributable to (and therefore imposed upon) plaintiffs than is the
position of the Federal Government on South Vietnam attributable to each of the
citizens who annually pay their federal taxes." Id.; see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 260 (1982) ("The tax system could not function if denominations were al-
lowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner
that violates their religious belief.").
61. 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).
62. See id. at 362 (finding that, while university need not supply funds to stu-
dent organizations, once it decides to do so, First Amendment requires that univer-
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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the union fees and integrated bar dues paradigm remain the guiding ana-
lytical tools in compelled funding cases.
63
B. Abood and the Union Dues Paradigm
The Supreme Court's decision in Abood affirms lower court decisions
that draw an analogy between mandatory student fees and union dues.
6 4
In Abood, teachers in the Detroit school system challenged the constitu-
tionality of an agency-shop agreement that required them to join the
union and pay a mandatory union service fee. 65 The Supreme Court held
that the Board of Education could compel nonunion teachers to pay the
sity act on content-neutral basis). In arriving at its decision, the Gohn court relied
on Justice Holmes's statement "that the taxpayers will occasionally be obligated to
support not only the thought of which they approve, but also the thought that they
hate." Id.; see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
851-52 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Student Activities Fund, then,
represents not government resources, whether derived from tax revenue, sales of
assets, or otherwise, but a fund that simply belongs to the students."); Arrington,
380 F. Supp. at 1362 ("[T]o allow a taxpayer to refuse to pay that portion of his [or
her] taxes which is used for informational purposes would undermine the entire
tax collection system. This principle seems applicable here."). But see Henry A.
Koshollek, Christian Tells Why He Took UW to Court, CAPrrAL TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at
2A (interviewing Scott Southworth on why he filed suit against University of Wis-
consin). Southworth, in his interview, addressed the dissimilarities between
mandatory student fees and taxation, stating:
The University of Wisconsin is not a sovereign government. I am a citizen
of Wisconsin; the state of Wisconsin has political powers over me. They
can tax me without me liking it. The federal government is sovereign. I
am a citizen of the United States. I am not a citizen of the University of
Wisconsin. The Associated Students of Madison has no authority over
me. They can't arrest me, they can't tax me. The Board of Regents does
not have the kind of sovereign power of a government. They only have
power that the states give them.
Id.
For a discussion of tax cases distinguishable from student fees cases, see Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (finding that Congress could appropriate in-
come tax revenue to fund political organization); Libertarian Party v. Packard, 741
F.2d 981, 990-91 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding Indiana's legislature could appropriate
money generated by what in effect constituted sales tax).
63. For a further discussion of the pervasiveness of the union fees and inte-
grated bar dues paradigm, see infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text. The com-
pelled funding cases' reliance on the income tax analogy also fails to take into
account the societal universality of the income tax as compared to the relatively
diminutive cross section of society affected in compelled funding cases involving
student activity fees. See Autenrieth v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 156, 156 (N.D.
Cal. 1968) (finding that tax involved in case is "imposed on all citizens regardless
of religious practices and affects the very life of the civil government under which
we live").
64. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222-23 (1977) (finding
that nonunion teachers payment of agency fee to promote collective bargaining
does not violate Constitution).
65. See id. at 211-13 (determining constitutionality of permitting union and
local employer to charge nonunion members compulsory service fees). Specifi-
cally, the Court sought to determine the constitutionality of agency-shop agree-
ments. See id. The Court stated the issue as whether:
13
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service fee so long as the money collected advanced ideological and polit-
ical causes germane to the Board's duties as a collective bargaining repre-
sentative. 66 Simply opposing a union organization on strategic grounds as
opposed to substantive grounds was not sufficient to obtain valid excep-
tions to the payment of mandatory fees.
67
The Abood Court, in reaching its decision, relied on Railway Employees'
Department v. Hanson68 and Street.69 While both Hanson and Street discussed
the constitutionality of using fees of union members for noncollective bar-
gaining purposes, the Abood Court posited the same question as it related
to nonunion members. 70 Recognizing the potential free rider problem
inherent in permitting nonunion members to reap the benefit of union
collective bargaining, nonunion members typically pay agency fees dedi-
cated solely to the advancement of collective bargaining. 71 The issue in
[Permitting unions and local employers] to agree to an "agency shop"
arrangement, whereby every employee represented by a union-even
though not a union member-must pay to the union, as a condition of
employment ... violates the constitutional rights of government employ-
ees who object to public-sector unions as such or to various union activi-
ties financed by the compulsory service fees.
Id. at 211.
66. See id. at 225-26 (finding that spending of union dues contributed by non-
union members must be germane to collective bargaining). The Court held that
"insofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the Union for the
purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjust-
ment, . . . [the Supreme Court decisions in Hanson and Street] appear to require
validation of the agency-shop agreement before us." Id.
67. See id. at 222 (citing Hanson and Street, Court found that peripheral inter-
ference with constitutional rights of union workers is 'justified by the ... impor-
tant contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by
Congress").
68. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). The Court in Hanson was concerned with financial
support for the union under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-162 (1994).
See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (finding that "the require-
ment for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive
the benefits of its work ... does not violate ... the First ... Amendment").
69. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 (citing Hanson and Street); see also International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769-70 (1961) (finding that compulsory
union dues for political purposes were impermissible under Railway Labor Act be-
cause it did not represent justified expenses related to union negotiation, adminis-
tration of collective bargaining agreement and adjusting of grievances and
disputes).
70. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 211 (discussing issue of union fee payment by non-
union workers).
71. See id. at 221-22 (discussing myriad of costs associated with reaching suc-
cessful collective bargaining agreement and representing interests of employees in
settling disputes and processing grievances). A free rider is an employee who takes
advantage of the union's responsibilities as exclusive employee representative to
negotiate and administer the collective bargaining agreement, including the rep-
resentation of all employees in dispute and grievance resolution; however, he or
she refuses to contribute to the union. See Schmitz, supra note 39, at 611 n.81
(discussing free rider problem). The free rider problem is solved by requiring
nonunion members to pay an agency fee equivalent to that portion of union dues
used for negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement,
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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Abood concerned the constitutionality of using such agency fees for
noncollective bargaining purposes. 72 In adopting the nonunion mem-
bers' argument, the Court held that a union may not spend a portion of
nonunion members' required service fees "to contribute to political candi-
dates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bar-
gaining representative."
73
Although it is a watershed case in the area of compelled funding,
Abood failed to address adequately each aspect of the restrictions placed on
the collection of union dues.74 Both in Abood and Chicago Teachers Union v.
Hudson,75 the Supreme Court recognized the need to adopt procedural
safeguards to prevent the unconstitutional allocation of compulsory fees.
76
In designing a procedure to minimize infringement upon nonunion em-
ployees' constitutional rights, the Hudson Court held that the union's col-
lection of agency fees must include: (1) "an adequate explanation" of the
fee calculation; (2) "a reasonably prompt opportunity" for nonunion em-
ployees to question the fee calculation "before an impartial decision-
maker"; and (3) "an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute" until
fee dispute resolution. 77 Additionally, the Court in Ellis v. Brotherhood of
including grievance resolution. See id. (discussing solution to free rider problem);
see also Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1986) (involving
agency fee amounting to 95% of union members' dues).
72. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 211 (stating that issue before Court was whether
agency-shop arrangement "violates the constitutional rights of government em-
ployees who object to public sector unions as such or to various union activities
financed by the compulsory service fees").
73. Id. at 234. The Court found that whereas the union was prevented from
assessing fees to objecting members and nonmembers for political or ideological
causes unrelated to public employment, the union could still fund such causes
with monies collected from employees "who do not object to advancing those ideas
and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of
governmental employment." Id.
74. See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302-03 (1986) (recognizing need to adopt proce-
dural safeguards that prevent infringement on First Amendment rights of ob-
jecting employees without restricting union's ability to require contribution to cost
of collective bargaining activities).
75. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
76. SeeJoel Martin Alam, The Future of Public Sector Union Security in the Seventh
Circuit Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local 1, 34 DEPAUL L. Rv. 837, 839
(1985) (noting that prior to Supreme Court's granting of certiorari on Hudson,
many issues remained unresolved in area of public sector union security
agreements).
77. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310. The Court required "absolute precision" in
agency fee calculation. See id. at 307 n.18 (noting need for precision in calculating
agency fees) (citing Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963)). To ensure
accuracy, the union could base its agency fee on the previous year's expenses and
was required to have such expenditures verified by an independent auditor. See id.
(permitting calculation of union fee on basis of expenses during preceding year).
Additionally, the Court enumerated several inadequate procedural approaches
that failed to safeguard nonunion members' constitutional rights. See id. at 305-07
(criticizing (1) pure rebate approach; (2) advance reduction of dues; and (3) lack
of prompt decision by impartial decisionmaker). A pure rebate approach was, in
effect, an involuntary loan to the union for purposes to which the employee ob-
1999] NOTE
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Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks78 restricted the broad holding in Abood
by finding that a union's nonpolitical social activities, even if unrelated to
collective bargaining, may be financed through union dues.
79
C. The Supreme Court After Abood-The Application of the Union Dues
Paradigm to Other Compelled Funding Scenarios
In Keller, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of compelled fund-
ing.8 0 The attorneys in Keller set forth a reverse First Amendment argu-
ment to challenge the California Bar's use of mandatory dues to finance
political and ideological activities objectionable to some bar members.
8 '
The Supreme Court held that as long as the use of such fees remains ger-
mane to the promotion and improvement of the legal profession, such
fees are not unconstitutional.8 2 In so ruling, the Court likened the bene-
fits received by employees from union-management negotiations to the
benefits the State Bar enjoyed in self-governance, and thus held that bar
members should be required to pay their fair share of the costs of profes-
sional involvement.
8 3
jected. See id. at 305 (noting that rebate does not avoid risk to dissenters that funds
may be temporarily used for improper purpose). The advance reduction of dues
proved inadequate because it provided objecting employees with insufficient infor-
mation to determine the appropriateness of the union's fee. See id. at 306 (finding
advance reduction of dues inadequate because it provided nonmembers with too
little information about basis for proportionate share of fee). Finally, the Court
found unacceptable the union's failure to provide for a reasonably prompt deci-
sion by an impartial decisionmaker. See id. at 307 (finding forced exaction did not
provide for reasonably prompt decision by impartial decisionmaker).
78. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
79. See id. at 455-57 (discussing limits on allocation of union dues to noncol-
lective bargaining activities).
80. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (finding State Bar's use
of compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with which mem-
bers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech when such ex-
penditures were not used for purpose of regulating legal profession or improving
quality of legal services).
81. See id. at 4-5 (stating that California State Bar is integrated bar, that is, one
that requires attorney membership and dues payment as conditions of practicing
law in state). Integrated bar associations are recognized as the governing body of
the state's legal profession. See id. at 5-6, 13 (noting that as governing body of legal
profession, integrated bar may determine membership criteria and standards for
admission to bar, formulate professional rules of conduct and handle disciplinary
matters).
82. See id. at 13-14 (finding that State Bar may constitutionally fund activities
out of mandatory dues of all members if germane to goals of governing legal
profession).
83. See id. at 12 (finding "substantial analogy between the relationship of the
State Bar and its members ... and the relationship of employee unions and their
members"). Specifically, the Court cited the elimination of the free rider problem
by enacting agency-shop laws to require union and nonunion members to pay
their fair share of union negotiating costs. See id. (discussing purpose of legislative
enactment of agency-shop law). Similarly, the Court recognized that the benefit
that State Bar members receive from self-regulation (e.g., the ability to recommend
16
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The germaneness criteria, set forth principally in the Supreme
Court's Abood and Keller decisions, provided the foundation for assessing
the constitutionality of mandatory student activity fee allocation.8 4 The
Court in Lehnert established a three-prong analysis for determining the
constitutionality of mandatory fees in the union context.8 5 Drawing on
Abood and Keller, the Court held that chargeable activities for nonunion
employees must: (1) be "germane" to collective bargaining activity; (2) be
justified by the government's vital policy interest in promoting labor peace
and avoiding "free riders" who benefit from union efforts without paying
for union services; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free
speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop.
8 6
criteria for admission to the bar, control of lawyer discipline and development of
the codes of professional conduct) presented some unique advantages of bar
membership. See id. (emphasizing importance of sharing costs of professional in-
volvement for regulation of law profession).
For a further discussion of the Keller decision, see Ralph H. Brock, Giving
Texas Lawyers Their Dues: The State Bar's Liability Under Hudson and Keller for Polit-
ical and Ideological Activities, 28 ST. MARV's L.J. 47, 53 (1996) (supporting Court's
decisions in Hudson and Keller as preventing "the historical drumbeat of opposition
to the unified bar from becoming the crescendo of litigation that has plagued
other state unified bars that have failed to protect the rights of dissenters"); David
F. Addicks, Note, Renovating the Bar After Keller v. State Bar of California: A Propo-
sal for"Strict Limits on Compulsory Fee Expenditure, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 681, 684 (1991)
(concluding that adoption of labor union paradigm and restriction against un-
checked spending of bar dues best protects lawyers, courts and citizens of
California).
84. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 516-18 (1991) (finding
decisions in Abood and Keller to address directly constitutionality of union fees dis-
tribution in public employment context). While differing on the proper place of
Abood in analogizing compelled funding cases other than those involving unions,
cases deciding the constitutionality of mandatory student activities fees neverthe-
less primarily use Abood as a focal point of analysis. See id. (analyzing constitutional-
ity of student activity fees under Abood analysis); see also Hays County Guardian v.
Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 123 (5th Cir. 1992) (extrapolating from Abood that govern-
ment may compel individuals to subsidize nongovernmental speech where such
compulsion accomplishes "government's vital policy interest"); Carroll v. Blinken,
957 F.2d 991, 997 (2d Cir. 1992) (analogizing automatic NYPIRG membership at
SUNY Albany to mandatory fees paid by nonunion employees in labor context);
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1063 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding Abood Court's labor
union analysis to be proper analysis in assessing constitutionality of mandatory stu-
dent activity fees); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1982) (discuss-
ing efficacy of using Abood analysis in assessing -validity of mandatory student
activity fees); Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 187 (1993)
(citing Abood and Keller as support for contention that government may not compel
person to contribute money to support political or ideological causes).
85. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519 (adopting three-prong analytical approach to
compelled funding cases).
86. See id. at 516-19 (setting forth three-prong analysis in assessing compelled
funding cases involving union dues). Despite the Court's clearly laid out test set
forth in Lehnert, two recent decisions, Smith and Carrol4 have not explicitly adopted
the three-prong test. For a discussion of the Smith decision, see infra notes 100-03
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Carroll decision, see infra notes 95-
96 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Lehnerttest. SeeAir Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 118 S.Ct. 1761, 1766 (1998) (relying
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Although the Court's analysis centered only on a union paradigm, the
Court did not explicitly exclude the use of such guidelines in determining
the constitutionality of other compelled funding scenarios.
8 7
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the University of Virginia,88 while declining to address the issue before the
court in Southworth, directed that the proper test for such a question re-
sides in the Abood and Keller analyses. 89 Additionally, the Court implicitly
upheld early student activity fee jurisprudence by finding that the denial
of free speech on campus for reasons of religious bias undermined both
the Establishment Clause and the ideal that university campuses should be
used for the presentation of all viewpoints. 90
on Lehnert's three-prong test). While breaking new ground in its use of the Lehnert
test in a mandatory student activities fees case, the Southworth court, given the reaf-
firmation of the test in Miller, holds truest to the Supreme Court's probable analy-
sis should it grant certiorari on the issue of mandatory student activity fees for
funding of private organizations. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 732-33
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding use of mandatory student activity fees for funding private
organizations violated free speech rights of objecting students), cert. granted, 119 S.
Ct. 1332 (1999).
87. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519 (stating that three-prong analysis sets forth
"several guidelines to be followed in making such determinations" in compelled
funding cases generally); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 840-41 (1995) (directing courts dealing with issues similar to those
presented in Southworth to look to Abood and Keller for guidance).
88. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
89. See id. at 840 (noting that answer to question presented in cases such as
Southworth turns on analyses found in Abood and Keller). The Rosenberger Court
stated that "[t]he fee is mandatory, and we do not have before us the question
whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to demand a pro rata
return to the extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she does not
subscribe." Id. (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977)); see id. at 851 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Finally, although the question is not presented here, I note the pos-
sibility that the student fee is susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an
objecting student that [he or] she should not be compelled to pay for speech with
which [he or] she disagrees."). For an additional discussion of the use of the Abood
and Keller analyses, see infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
90. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840, 845-56 (finding that University of Virginia
engaged in viewpoint discrimination against Christian newspaper by denying fund-
ing, thus violating First Amendment). In finding that the university's denial of
funding to the campus Christian paper, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the
University of Virginia, for the sole reason that the paper "primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belie [f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," the Court
did not reach the issue of "whether an objecting student has the First Amendment
right to demand a pro rata return to the extent the fee is expended for speech to
which he or she does not subscribe." Id. at 823, 840. By finding the denial of
funding unconstitutional, the Court implicitly upheld the concept set forth in
early student fee jurisprudence permitting the university to create a marketplace
of ideas void of viewpoint discrimination within the campus walls. See id. at 844
(finding university to be "a pure forum for the expression of ideas" that would
otherwise remain under-represented).
A number of commentators have addressed Rosenberger and its impact. See,
e.g., David Schimmel, Discrimination Against Viewpoints Prohibited in Public Colleges
and Universities: An Analysis ofRosenberger v. The University of Virginia, 102 EDUc.
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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D. The Circuit Split-How to Apply the Abood and Keller Analyses
to Student Activity Fee Cases
The Abood and, in recent years, the Keller analyses have provided a
springboard for examination of compelled funding cases in not only
union fee and integrated bar dues cases, but also in student activity fee
cases.9 1 Despite agreement as to the proper analytical framework, the
courts of appeals are split on exactly how to apply the union dues and
integrated bar fees analyses to student activity fee cases.
9 2
The controversy surrounds whether the above paradigm includes the
use of mandatory fees to finance independent organizations outside of the
campus that promote political and ideological philosophy or whether on-
campus speech is also included. 9 3 On the one hand, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Galda v. Rutgers 4 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Carroll v. Blinken
9 5 limit
their analyses to mandatory fees that finance "an independent outside or-
ganization that espouses and actively promotes a political and ideological
L. REP. 911 (1995) (analyzing impact of Rosenberger decision on Establishment and
Free Speech Clauses of First Amendment); Kara R. Moheban, Comment, Constitu-
tional Law-Establishment Clause Does Not Compel University to Deny Funding to Reli-
gious Student Publication-Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 237 (1996) (discussing
impact on Establishment Clause jurisprudence in wake of Rosenberger decision);
John S. Stolz, Note, The Speech and the Establishment Clauses-Within a Program of
Generally Applicable Benefits, a Public University's Refusal to Pay for the Printing Costs of a
Student Journal with an Avowedly Christian Perspective, While Willingly Paying for the
Printing Costs of Many Non-Religious Journals, is Viewpoint Discrimination and Not Man-
dated by the Establishment Clause-Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univer-
sity of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), 7 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 1047 (1997)
(analyzing impact of Rosenberger decision on Establishment and Free Speech
Clauses of First Amendment); Marcia Coyle, Court Face-Off in School Fees Case, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 13, 1995, at A16 (discussing Rosenberger suit); Virginia Fund Refusal Backed,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 28, 1994, at A8 (same).
91. See Schmitz, supra note 39, at 614 (disagreeing with adoption of Abood
standard in analyzing mandatory student activity fee cases where funding remains
exclusively on campus). One critic argues that two categories of cases exist in the
post-Abood era: those in which courts are "willing to adopt an analogy between
labor union and/or integrated state bar association dues and mandatory student
fees and those [in which courts are] unwilling to do so." Id. Those courts choos-
ing to adopt the labor union or integrated state bar association dues analogy to
mandatory student fees include Carroll and Galda. See id. at 614-17 (discussing
adoption of Abood and Keller analyses by courts in Carroll and Galda). The courts in
Supple, Kania and Turner v. Sayers, 575 So. 2d 1135 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), reject
such an analogy under Schmitz's analysis. See Schmitz, supra note 39, at 614-17
(discussing rejection of Abood and Keller analyses by courts in Supple, Kania and
Turner).
92. For a discussion of the current circuit split in applying the union dues and
integrated bar fees paradigm, see infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
93. For a further discussion of this controversy, see infra notes 94-103 and
accompanying text.
94. 772 F.2d 1060 ( d Cir. 1985).
95. 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992).
NOTE
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philosophy."9 6 In contrast, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits in Kania v. Fordham9 7 and Hays County Guardian
v. Supple,9 8 respectively, read Abood broadly to encompass any speech that
accomplishes the government's vital policy interest, regardless of its rela-
tionship to the campus environment.9 9
The California Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California'00 presents one of the most recent decisions addressing
the constitutionality of mandatory student activity fees.1 0' In Smith, the
California Supreme Court held that the collection of mandatory student
activity fees was within the constitutional authority of the Regents; how-
ever, the use of such fees to fund political and ideological groups violated
the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and association of the stu-
dents who opposed such views. 10 2 Commentators, however, have criti-
cized the Smith decision both for its misapplication of the then-infant
Lehnert doctrine and its overly broad holding.
103
Against the above backdrop of cases involving issues of free speech,
union dues, bar association fees and conflicting notions of educational
purpose, the court in Southworth tackled the issue of the constitutionality
of mandatory student activity fees that support private organizations
outside the campus environment. 10 4 The Southworth decision represents
96. Galda, 772 F.2d at 1064; see Carroll 957 F.2d at 997 (finding that like "non-
union employees bound to pay fees to a union that ... spends the money on
political speech, or members of a state bar whose dues finance ideological activities
like lobbying, appellants [correctly] see the student activity fee and ... automatic
NYPIRG membership as vehicles for compelled speech and association").
97. 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
98. 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992).
99. See id. at 123 (finding educational goals of Southwest Texas State Univer-
sity "sufficiently weighty to justify the University's subsidy of a student-run newspa-
per"); see also Kania, 702 F.2d at 480 (concluding that University of North Carolina
did not violate students' constitutional rights by funding student-run paper with
mandatory student activity fees because financing of paper was "germane to the
University's duties as an educational institution").
100. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181 (1993).
101. See id. at 192 (drawing on, but not whole-heartedly embracing, decisions
in Carroll, Galda, Abood and Keller, Smith court fashioned central question in com-
pelled funding cases to be whether collection of mandatory fees is germane to
university's educational mission).
102. See id. at 198 (finding that system of funding in existence at time of litiga-
tion must be discontinued until such time as university fashions appropriate rem-
edy for dissenting students).
103. See Schmitz, supra note 39, at 645 (finding decision in Smith poorly rea-
soned, contrary to settled law and susceptible to overruling by subsequent deci-
sion); Kramer, supra note 43, at 691 (finding ruling in Smith to be new
constitutional limitation on university's use of mandatory student fees); Waring,
supra note 46, at 541 (finding Smith decision, with its "indifference to the princi-
ples of academic freedom," to be threat to free exchange of ideas at public
universities).
104. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1998) (objecting to
university practice of supporting private organizations engaged in political and ide-
ological activities), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999).
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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Students attending the University of Wisconsin-Madison must pay a
mandatory student activity fee. 10 6 In Southworth, Plaintiffs Scott South-
worth, Amy Schoepke, Keith Bannach, Rebecca Bretz and Rebecka Vander
Werf were law students at the University who challenged the above policy
by bringing a suit against the Board of Regents of the University of Wis-
consin System ("the Regents").107 Plaintiffs claimed that the Regents' use
of the mandatory student activity fees to fund private organizations that
engage in political and ideological advocacy, activities and speech violated
their rights of free speech and association.10 8 Specifically, the students
challenged "whether the Regents can force objecting students to fund pri-
vate organizations which engage in political and ideological activities,
speech, and advocacy."'
0 9
105. For a discussion of the court's decision in Southworth, see infra notes 106-
75 and accompanying text.
106. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 717 (discussing university's policy regarding
mandatory student activity fees). Students refusing to pay such mandatory student
activity fees cannot receive their grades or graduate. See id. at 719. Fees for the
1995-96 academic year, the year during which plaintiffs filed suit, were $165.75 per
semester. See id. (citing amount of mandatory student activity fees for 1995-96 aca-
demic year). The University of Wisconsin is not alone in treating mandatory fees
as a necessary portion of tuition. See Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1351
(M.D.N.C. 1974) (noting that University of North Carolina Board of Governors
assessed late fees to delinquent students and withheld grades, transcripts and even
diplomas if fees remained unpaid).
107. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718 (describing participants in case); see also
Koshollek, supra note 62, at 2A (interviewing Scott Southworth on why he decided
to sue university system and his relationship with Alliance Defense Fund, Christian
rights organization).
108. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718-19 (noting plaintiffs' additional claims
based on Free Exercise Clause of Constitution, Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994), and various state laws). Whereas
the plaintiffs asserted various grounds upon which they sought relief, their claim
under RFRA no longer applies in light of the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), which ruled unconstitutional Congress'
enactment of RFRA. See id. at 2172.
109. Southworth, 151 F.3d at 722. The students did not ask that the court re-
strict the speech of any student organization; rather, they requested that they not
be forced to subsidize financially speech with which they disagreed. See id. at 721
(noting that campus organizations may support particular causes, but First Amend-
ment does not guarantee government subsidization of such speech). Additionally,
the students did not challenge the following:
[T]he Regents' authority to collect student activity fees; the Regents' use
of the non-allocable portion of the student activity fee; the Regents' use
of the allocable portion of the student activity fee to fund the student
government; the Regents' use of the allocable portion of the student ac-
tivity fee to fund private organizations which do not engage in political or
ideological speech, activities, or advocacy; the Regents' use of the alloca-
21
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Section 36.09 of the Wisconsin State Code provides for both Regents'
and student control over the funds generated by the mandatory student
activity fee. 110 The Regents designate part of the monies as allocable and
part as nonallocable."'1 The former portion is dispersed primarily by the
students under the auspices of the Associated Students of Madison (ASM)
and the latter portion is almost exclusively controlled by the Regents. 112
Plaintiffs challenged only the allocable portion of student fees. 113
Student groups may obtain portions of the allocable money through
three different sources: the ASM budget, the General Student Service
Fund (GSSF) and student referenda. 114 All ASM-, GSSF- and student ref-
ble portion of non-objecting students' activity fees to fund private organiza-
tions engaging in political or ideological speech, activities, or advocacy;
or the Regents' use of the allocable portion of the student activity fee to
fund the student newspaper, or the Distinguished Lecture Series.
Id.
110. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(1) (h) (West 1997) (providing that University
of Wisconsin Board of Regents "shall allocate funds and adopt budgets for the
respective institutions"). The Code provides for the following:
The students of each institution or campus subject to the responsibilities
and powers of the board, the president, the chancellor and the faculty
shall be active participants in the immediate governance of and policy
development for such institutions .... Students in consultation with the
chancellor and subject to the final confirmation of the board shall have
the responsibility for the disposition of those student fees which consti-
tute substantial support for campus student activities.
Id. § 36.09(1)(L) (5).
111. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 719 (noting that although student government
representatives review and offer suggestions regarding nonallocable fees, Regents
have primary control over such funds).
112. See id. ("[Nionallocable fees cover expenses such as debt service, fixed
operating costs of auxiliary operations, student health services and the first and
second year of the Recreational Sports budget.").
113. See id. (noting that because plaintiffs challenged only funding from allo-
cable portion of student activity fees, Southworth court focused its analysis solely on
those expenditures).
114. See id. at 719-20 (noting rather complicated distribution network for allo-
cable student fees). Fees allocated by the ASM fund both the General Student
Service Fund (GSSF) and the ASM budget. See id. at 719 (discussing "money trail"
to explain source of plaintiffs' complaint). In turn, both the ASM and GSSF dis-
tribute funds to other private organizations. See id. (introducing differences be-
tween distribution process for GSSF and ASM). The GSSF funds are distributed to
registered student organizations (RSOs), University departments and community-
based service organizations by a committee of the ASM called the Student Services
Finance Committee (SSFC). See id. (outlining application and qualification proce-
dure followed to obtain money from GSSF). After reviewing the application, the
SSFC determines the amount of funding the private organization will receive. See
id. (explaining role of SSFC in allocation of grants or denials of money). During
the 1995-96 school year, the SSFC distributed about $975,200 in student fees to
private organizations. See id. (highlighting amount distributed in student fees dur-
ing 1995-96).
Although the ASM budget also funds student groups, it may only fund RSOs.
See id. at 719-20 (singling out limited groups eligible for ASM funding). To be
designated as an RSO, the organization must "be a formalized not-for-profit group,
composed mainly, but not necessarily exclusively, of students, and controlled and
[Vol. 44: p. 257
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss2/4
1999] NoTE 279
erenda-approved allocations are subject to review and approval by the Re-
gents.1 1 5 Although monies dispersed from the GSSF, the ASM budget and
student referenda can fund a variety of different activities and organiza-
tions, the plaintiffs objected only to the funding of organizations that en-
gaged in political and ideological activities. 1 16 The court limited its
analysis to address only those eighteen organizations deemed objectiona-
ble by the students. 117 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
directed by students." Id. During the 1995-96 school year, the ASM budget distrib-
uted $109,277 in student fees to private organizations. See id. at 720 (highlighting
ASM's contribution to private organizations during 1995-96).
Finally, students may also receive money through a student referendum
whereby the entire student body votes on whether to approve an assessment for
the particular student group. See id. (discussing alternative means for RSO to ob-
tain funds). As an example, Wisconsin Student Public Interest Research Group
(WISPIRG) obtained $49,500 in student fees during the 1995-96 academic year as
a result of a student referendum. See id. (providing example of utility and poten-
tial resource of student referendum).
115. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(1) (L) (5) ("Students in consultation with the
chancellor and subject to the final confirmation of the board shall have the re-
sponsibility for the disposition of those student fees which constitute substantial
support for campus student activities.").
116. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720 (noting limited scope of plaintiffs' claim).
117. See id. (listing objectionable organizations). For a list of the 18 objection-
able organizations, see supra note 22 and accompanying text. While the record
was replete with examples of objectionable political and ideological activities, the
court examined several different organizations to demonstrate the students' objec-
tions. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720-21 (adding that review of funding to 18 orga-
nizations that plaintiffs object to must be completed "in the light most favorable to
the Regents"). For example, WISPIRG received $49,500 in student fees during the
1995-96 academic year, of which it distributed $2500 directly to its parent organiza-
tion, U.S. PIRG, for use in lobbying Congress and developing candidate-voter
guides that ranked various Congresspersons based on their views about specific
pieces of federal legislation. See id. at 720 (revealing WISPIRG's funding and use
of monies during 1995-96). UW Greens and the Progressive Student Network lob-
bied the Wisconsin legislature to introduce three bills that would limit mining in
the state. See id. (noting that UW Greens received $6905 of student fee money).
The International Socialist Organization (ISO), another recipient of student fees,
advocated the overthrow of the government. See id. (illustrating that ISO advo-
cated revolution over reform due to inability of working class to successfully over-
take and control capitalist government structures). Along with UW Greens and
other groups, the ISO sponsored a rally at the state capitol and at a congressper-
son's office. See id. at 720-21 (commenting on types of activities engaged in by
ISO). In an unrelated event, the ISO, along with 400 other participants, demon-
strated outside of a church to oppose the ideological views of the church speaker.
See id. (revealing reactions of funded groups, like ISO, to beliefs and views contrary
to their own).
The Campus Women's Center, which received $34,200 in student fees, used
its bimonthly newsletter, The Source, to oppose the Informed Consent Bill that pro-
posed certain regulations on abortion. See id. at 721 (adding that newsletter
sought support for united action against stipulated legislation). Finally, the Ten
Percent Society used campus funding to advocate legislation authorizing same-sex
marriages on their Internet home page. See id. (showing funding was provided to
organizations that openly stated on funding applications that they were "active in
the political arena").
23
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determination that forcing objecting students to fund private organiza-




1. The Declaratory Judgment
The Seventh Circuit addressed the limited question of whether the
Regents retained the power to "force objecting students to fund organiza-
tions which engage in political and ideological activities, speech and advo-
cacy. " 119 The court began with the premise that the First Amendment,
despite its broad language, contains two necessary corollaries to the guar-
antee of free speech: (1) "the right not to speak"120 and (2) "the right not
to be compelled to subsidize others' speech."'
21
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether
the First Amendment protects objecting students from subsidizing private
political and ideological organizations at public universities. 122 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger directed that the proper
test for such a question resides in the Abood and Keller analyses.' 23 Not
only did the Rosenberger Court suggest the adoption of the Abood and Keller
analyses as the applicable standard for mandatory student activity fee
cases, but so has every circuit faced with the present issue. 124 The South-
118. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732-33 ("[T]he Regents cannot use the alloca-
ble portion of objecting students' mandatory activity fees to fund organizations
which engage in political or ideological activities, advocacy, or speech.").
119. Id. at 722.
120. Id. (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
121. Id. (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977)).
122. SeeRosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840
(1995) (noting that case addressed student activity fee that is created to "reflect
the reality that student life . . . includes the necessity of wide-ranging speech and
inquiry and that student expression is an integral part of ... the educational mis-
sion"). For a further discussion of Rosenberger, see supra notes 88-90, infra note 123
and accompanying text.
123. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (finding that "[t]he fee is mandatory, and
we do not have before us the question whether an objecting student has the First
Amendment right to demand a pro rata return to the extent the fee is expended
for speech to which he or she does not subscribe") (citing Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-16;
Abood, 431 U.S. at 237); see also id. at 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Finally,
although the question is not presented here, I note the possibility that the student
fee is susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an objecting student that
[he or] she should not be compelled to pay for speech with which [he or] she
disagrees.").
124. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 723 (citing Hays County Guardian v. Supple,
969 F.2d 111, 123 (5th Cir. 1992); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 997 (2d Cir.
1992); Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 1985); Kania v. Fordham,
702 F.2d 475, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1983)). The court also drew attention to Smith v.
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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standard as the authoritative analytical tool.
1 25
While courts agree on the appropriate test to use in analyzing general
compelled funding cases, the flagship cases of Abood and Keller gave only
sparse guidance as to the actual application of the germaneness analysis in
the student activity fee context.1 26 As a result, circuits are split on how to
apply the analyses.127 The Southworth court was not, however, without gui-
dance in determining the most appropriate analytical framework for
mandatory fee cases.128 Relying on holdings from several Supreme Court
decisions, most notably Lehnert, the Southworth court adopted a three-
prong analysis with which to determine whether mandatory student activ-
ity fees violate students' First Amendment rights.
129
First, under the germaneness prong of the Lehnert analysis, the court
recognized two distinct questions: (1) whether there was some otherwise
legitimate governmental interestjustifying any compelled funding and (2)
whether the specifically challenged expenditure was germane to that inter-
est. 130 Because the students did not contest the first proposition, the
Regents of the University of California, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181 (1993), as an example of a
state court relying on the union dues and integrated bar fees analogy. See South-
worth, 151 F.3d at 723 (discussing additional circuits' finding support from Abood
and Keller analyses).
125. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 723 ("From Keller's holding ('The State Bar
may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals. .. .') and
Aboods qualification (the Constitution requires that expenditures for ideological
cause not germane be financed by voluntary funds), courts have named the analy-
sis born of Abood the 'germaneness analysis.'") (citations omitted); see also Wiggin,
supra note 43, at 2014 (finding germaneness question central to compelled fund-
ing cases).
126. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 723 (recognizing that circuits are split on how
to apply Abood and Keller analyses to student fee cases).
127. For a further discussion of the circuit split in applying the Abood and
Keller analyses, see supra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
128. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 724 (deferring to Lehnert three-prong analysis
along with several prior decisions in determining framework for constitutional in-
quiry in mandatory student activity fee cases).
129. See id. (adopting Lehnert, labor union case involving issues analogous to
issues in Southworth, as proper approach in applying germaneness test as set forth
in Abood and Keller). The three-prong test as it pertains to questions of union fees
is: (1) whether the expenditure must be germane to collective bargaining; (2)
whether the expenditure was justified by the government's vital policy interest in
labor peace and avoiding free riders; and (3) whether the expenditure would not
significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance
of an agency or union shop. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519
(1991) (setting forth analysis). The Supreme Court recently upheld the Lehnert
test. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (1998) (upholding
Lehnert analysis as appropriate test in union dues context).
130. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 724 (breaking down germaneness prong into
two distinct questions) (citing Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 507, 519).
1999] NOTE
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Southworth court dealt only with the latter.' 3' In finding for the plaintiffs
on the germaneness prong, the court held that it could not read the ger-
maneness prong so broadly as to justify the compelled funding of private
organizations that engage in political and ideological speech. 132 To sup-
port its conclusion, the court adopted a narrow view of the germaneness
prong, citing both Kellerand Lehnert.133 In so doing, the court rejected the
more expansive, though still limited, view of germaneness found in Carroll
and instead adopted the reasoning of those circuits that follow Galda and
Smith. 1
34
Even assuming that the allocation of student activity fees to fund polit-
ical and ideological speech proved germane to the University's mission,
the court found that the Regents failed to prove the second prong of the
Lehnert analysis: whether there was a vital governmental policy interest nec-
essary to justify compelled fees.1 35 Whereas the court recognized the Re-
131. See id. (noting that students did not argue that Regents lacked "legiti-
mate interest in the compelled funding of the student government or student
organizations").
132. See id. at 725 (rejecting overly broad reading of germaneness prong) (cit-
ing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990)); Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 520
(same).
133. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 724-25 (citing Keller and Lehnert as examples of
narrow interpretation of germaneness prong). The Court in Keller found that the
State Bar's assertion that funding of lobbying on nuclear weapons, abortion and
prayer in public schools "in all matters pertaining to the advancement of the sci-
ence ofjurisprudence or to the improvement of the administration ofjustice" was
too broad in scope to withstand constitutional muster. Keller, 496 U.S. at 15. Simi-
larly, the Lehnert Court held that "expenses that are ... 'germane' to the collective-
bargaining functions of the union.., will be constitutionally chargeable to dissent-
ing employees .... [I]n the private sector, those functions do not include political
or ideological activities." Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 516. The Court went on to state:
Where, as here, the challenged lobbying activities relate not to the ratifi-
cation or implementation of a dissenter's collective-bargaining agree-
ment, but to financial support of the employee's profession or of public
employees generally, the connection to the union's function as bargain-
ing representative is too attenuated to justify compelled support by ob-
jecting employees.
Id. at 520.
134. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726-27 (analyzing various circuit courts' com-
pelled funding decisions). The court in Carroll permitted the allocation of activity
fee funds to support NYPIRG "as long as that organization spends the equivalent of
the students' contribution on campus and thus serves the university's substantial
interests in collecting the fee." Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 992 (2d Cir.
1992). The Galda court, on the other hand, found that NJPIRG, while serving a
valuable political and ideological purpose, produced only incidental benefits to
the institution's educational goals. See Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1065 (3d
Cir. 1985) (providing that only incidental educational benefit did not warrant in-
fringing on dissenting students' speech and association rights). The Southworth
court also cited Smith v. Regents of the University of California, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181
(1993), which, along with Galda, provided it with more persuasive arguments than
those in Carroll. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726 (adopting Galda and Smith
analyses).
135. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727 (finding that "[l]abor peace is not espe-
cially served by ... charging objecting employees for lobbying, electoral and other
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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gents' vital government interest in education, the court found no essential
policy interest in permitting compelled funding of private and quasi-pri-
vate activity. 136 Finally, the court dismissed the notion of a free rider
problem emerging from the restriction on mandatory fees.
13 7
The Regents' third and final argument failed to prove that the Uni-
versity's compelled funding would not "'significantly add to the burdening
of free speech inherent in achieving those interests.' 1 3 8 Applying the
Lehnert standard, the court found that using student activity fees created
an unacceptable degree of infringement upon free expression, touching
upon such sensitive areas as abortion, homosexuality and the democratic
system of the United States. 139 Finding that the mandatory fees com-
political activities that do not relate to their collective-bargaining agreement") (cit-
ing Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 521). Extrapolating from the Lehnert holding, the South-
worth court derived the need for a common cause to justify the compelled funding.
See id. (comparing union cases and compelled funding cases). The court in South-
worth, however, found "no common cause between private organizations which en-
gage in political and ideological speech and the objecting student." Id. at 728.
136. See id. at 727 (discussing justification of compelled fee by determining
"vital policy interest of the government"). Specifically, the State Regents set forth
two arguments: (1) the Regents' interest in education and (2) their interest in
allowing students to share in the governance of the university system. See id. (dis-
tinguishing Regents' interests from those of unions and state bars). The court
found neither of these interests to be vital under the guidelines set forth in Lehnert.
See id. (finding vital policy interests must survive scrutiny of Lehnert). In fact, the
court could not posit a hypothetical situation in which the latter interest would
prove vital at all. See id. (revealing that court's initial doubt concerning whether
second interest was "vital" proved to be warranted). Furthermore, forcing ob-
jecting students to fund objectionable organizations may in effect undermine edu-
cational ideas such as individualism and dissent. See id. at 728 (emphasizing
potential disadvantages due to compelled funding of private organizations).
137. See id. at 728-29 (rejecting Regents' contention that free rider problem,
similar to that present in Abood, existed in present case). In distinguishing Abood
from Southworth, the court pointed out that in the case of unions, the government
has imposed upon unions the duty to represent fairly all employees; as a result,
"[f]orcing non-union employees to fund the union's collective bargaining agree-
ment [helps to] counteract[ ] the incentive that employees might otherwise have
to become free riders-to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining bene-
fits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees." Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1977). In comparison, the private orga-
nizations funded by the University of Wisconsin student activity fees have no obli-
gation to represent fairly the students as is the case in the union context. See
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728-29 (noting that Regents' permitting outside students to
join campus activities demonstrated their somewhat disingenuous claim to free
rider concern).
138. Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729 (quoting Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519).
139. See id. at 729-30 (recognizing that while hateful and objectionable speech
has its place in our society, Constitution does not mandate that citizens pay for
such speech) (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550
(1983)); see also Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2138
(1997) (finding that use of compelled funding for generic advertising of certain
California fruits did not abridge plaintiffs First Amendment rights because speech
imposed did not limit plaintiffs right to speak or compel plaintiff to endorse ob-
jectionable political and ideological views); Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 521-22 (finding that
political lobbying using objecting employees' fees to garner public support
1999] NOTE
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pelled students to contribute to organizations whose expressive activities
conflicted with objecting students' freedom of belief, the court held that
the Regents did not satisfy the third requirement under Lehnert.
140
2. Injunctive Relief Held to be Overly Broad
The court next turned to the question of precisely how to issue an
injunction against the Regents and protect the plaintiffs' right not to fund
objectionable speech. 141 The court rejected a pure refund mechanism
because it permitted the Regents to use full dues to fund private poli-
tical groups and only months later reimburse the students.14 2 By doing
so, the Regents would effectively charge students for the funding of ob-
jectionable speech, albeit temporarily, thus causing them harm.' 4 3 Any
post-allocation refund would not address the students' constitutional
objections.
1 44
presented undue interference with First Amendment rights of objecting employ-
ees); Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35 (contrasting right not to be compelled to contribute
to expressive activities opposed to one's personal belief with being compelled to
support unobjectionable activities).
140. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 731 (finding that students' objections embody
values protected by "the heart of the First Amendment").
141. See id. at 733 (stating that district court ordered "that the defendants,
their officers, employees and other agents shall forthwith cease the funding of
private groups that engage in ideological or political advocacy"). In addition, the
trial court ordered the Regents to: (1) publish written notice of organizations en-
gaging in political and ideological speech; (2) list the pro rata share of mandatory
fees devoted to those organizations; and (3) establish an arbitration proceeding
for disputes over the amount of fees paid and the nature of the organizations in-
volved. See id. (outlining provisions of injunction issued by district court).
142. See id. at 735 (discussing stringent prohibition against temporarily col-
lecting dues from objecting students to fund private ideological and political
activities).
143. See id. at 733 (prohibiting even temporary collection of objecting stu-
dents' fees to fund political and ideological activities). The court borrowed the
reasoning from Ellis where the Supreme Court stated:
By exacting and using full dues, then refunding months later the portion
that it was not allowed to exact in the first place, the union effectively
charges the employees for activities that are outside the scope of the stat-
uary authorization. The cost to the employee is, of course, much less
than if the money was never returned, but this is a difference of degree
only. The harm would be reduced were the union to pay interest on the
amount refunded, but respondents did not do so. Even then the union
obtains an involuntary loan for purposes to which the employee objects.
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 443-45 (1984).
144. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733 (noting pure rebate approach inade-
quately protects constitutional rights) (citing Ellis, 466 U.S. at 443-45). The court
asserted that the administrative convenience of such programs was insufficient to
overcome the constitutional infirmities. See id. (citing Hudson as example of suc-
cessful refund system). Yet the court offered scant evidence to support such an
assertion, pointing only to prior Court dicta stating that there indeed were accepta-
ble alternatives. See id. (noting Supreme Court precedent permitting rebate sys-
tems to stand in union and bar association cases) (citing Chicago Teachers Union
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1985); Ellis, 466 U.S. at 443-45).
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The court attempted to limit the injunctive relief so as to address only
those groups deemed objectionable by the plaintiffs. 145 Rather than re-
quiring the cessation of all funding to private groups engaged in ideologi-
cal or political advocacy, the court pared down the injunctive relief.1 46 In
granting relief, the court permitted the Regents to devise a fee system con-
sistent with the court's opinion, giving particular attention to the princi-
ples of federalism.1 47 In the meantime, the University could not even
temporarily collect any portion of student fees that support political and
ideological speech offensive to the objecting students.
148
B. Critical Analysis
The court's reliance on the tests set forth in Abood (union dues) and
Keller (integrated bar fees) reflects the proper analytical framework under
which compelled funding cases should be analyzed. 149 Whereas scholars
145. See id. at 733-34 (rejecting portions of district court's injunction). The
court showed its first signs of discomfort with any type of refund mechanism, rec-
ognizing both the impossibility of a straight refund and a lack of workable alterna-
tives. See id. ("[W]e agree with the Regents that the [injunctive] order is
overbroad in some respects."). In fact, earlier in the opinion, the court illumi-
nated the problems inherent in earmarking objecting students' funds so as not to
fall into the hands of political and ideological groups. See id. at 731-32 (referring
to such practices as "merely a bookkeeping matter" where "[t] he dollars are fungi-
ble and splitting the same amount in two directions does not cure the obvious
subsidy").
146. See id. at 733-34 (noting that sweeping pro rata solution advanced by dis-
trict court permitted students to avoid paying for nonprivately funded campus or-
ganizations to which students did not object).
147. See id. at 734 (finding that district court failed to recognize that federal-
ism concerns require caution in ordering states to take certain action). The court
also stated that while it is appropriate to issue an injunction dictating what a state
cannot do, federalism requires restraint in ordering a state to act. See id. (finding
that problematic injunctions, replete with interpretive difficulties, should be used
only as last resort) (citing ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 798 (7th Cir. 1995)). In
essence, federalism requires broad deference to the states whereby states should
not be required to do more than is minimally necessary for compliance with fed-
eral law. See Clark v. Coye, 60 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing three-
prong test used in assessing enforceability of injunction).
148. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 735 (reiterating restriction on University to
forego temporary collection).
149. See Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 123 (5th Cir. 1992)
(extrapolating from Abood that government may compel individuals to subsidize
nongovernmental speech where such compulsion accomplishes "government's vi-
tal policy interest"); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 997 (2d Cir. 1992) (analogiz-
ing automatic NYPIRG membership at SUNY Albany with mandatory fees paid by
nonunion employees in labor context); Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1064 (3d
Cir. 1985) (finding Abood Court's labor union analysis to be proper analysis in
assessing constitutionality of mandatory student activity fees); Kania v. Fordham,
702 F.2d 475, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing efficacy of using Abood analysis in
assessing validity of mandatory student activity fees).
Not all scholars agree that the Abood and Keller analyses apply to student activ-
ity fee cases where schools provide funding only to on-campus organizations. See
Schmitz, supra note 39, at 625 (recognizing that cases such as Smith dealt with
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have cited inherent problems with analogizing union dues and integrated
bar fees cases to student activity fees cases, it is not appropriate for the
appellate court system to disregard well-established Supreme Court prece-
dent in this area. 150 Nevertheless, the court's heavy reliance on Lehnert
poses several problems. 15 1 Although the Court upheld the Lehnert analysis
in Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller,152 it has not expressly expanded the hold-
ing to encompass other compelled funding situations, such as integrated
bar fees or student activity fees.
153
Case law supports the Southworth court's first contention that speech
by private interest groups is not germane to a university's goals.
154
mandatory fees used to fund activities of recognized student groups with purpose
of exposing university community to "a potpourri of ideas and viewpoints" and not
to fund independent organizations whose activities are directed towards public at
large producing only incidental educational benefits to university students).
Although the above view has merit, Southworth deals with private organizations
outside of the campus walls; therefore, such a theory does not apply to this Note's
analysis. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720-22 (describing activities of groups funded
by student activity fees).
150. For a discussion of the efficacy of the Abood and Keller analyses, see supra
notes 49-90 and accompanying text. But see Schmitz, supra note 39, at 626 (finding
employee-employer relationship in context of unions and state bar associations to
differ dramatically from student-university relationship). One scholar contended
that the employment relationship differs from the educational relationship with
respect to organizational purpose, membership composition and the decisionmak-
ing processes behind funding allocation. See id. (finding purpose of relationship
between students and university is education). For example, whereas labor unions
organize for collective bargaining purposes and bar associations organize for pro-
fessional solidarity and strength, university students enter the educational arena
for less specified and less discernible reasons. See id. at 626-28 (calling into ques-
tion Smith's analogy involving labor union, integrated state bar association and stu-
dent body). Additionally, this scholar points out that a university, unlike unions
and bar associations, may not compel a student to be a member of a particular
association as a condition to enrollment in the university (although it may collect
mandatory fees). See id. at 629 (noting difference in compelled association be-
tween unions and bar association and those at public universities); see also Galda,
772 F.2d at 1071 (Adams, J., dissenting) (finding that mandatory student activity
fees cases represent collision of as many as four lines of First Amendment doctrine;
namely, compelled speech and association, content-based limitations on speech,
public forum protections and judicial oversight of universities and academic free-
dom); Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 201 (1993)
(finding First Amendment doctrines addressed in union dues and integrated bar
fees cases have never before been addressed by Supreme Court).
151. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725 n.5 (rationalizing reliance on Lehnert anal-
ysis by stating: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds"' (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977))).
152. 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998).
153. See id. (noting Lehnert's three-prong test).
154. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 520 (1991) (rejecting
overly broad reading of germaneness); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1990) (same). The Court in Lehnert stated that germaneness cannot be read so
broadly as to include ideological and political activities of private sector groups.
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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Although it is true that "[w]ithin wide limitation a state is free to adopt
such educational philosophy as it chooses," the courts must differentiate
between exposing students to speakers outside the classroom yet inside
the campus walls and the promotion of private organizations entirely re-
moved from the campus environs. 15 5 The court in Southworth recognized
such a distinction.
15 6
The second prong in the Lehnert analysis, requiring that union activi-
ties be germane to collective bargaining activity, creates a problematic
jump in logic from the union dues paradigm. First, the problem of free
riders, a vexing difficulty in the union dues paradigm, is not an issue in
the student activity fees context. 15 7 Second, and more notably, the failure
See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 516 (following narrow definition of germaneness); see also
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 452 (1984) (hold-
ing that although union activities in question may benefit collective bargaining,
benefits were too attenuated to be germane).
155. See Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Neb. 1973) (noting
that education of students extended beyond classroom, but not necessarily beyond
campus environment).
156. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726-27 (finding that if it were to decide case
based solely on CarrolI Galda and Smith, it would find Galda and Smith analyses to
be more persuasive). Unlike the court in Carroll, the Galda court recognized the
deeply troubling break with precedent should students be forced into funding
outside organizations espousing objectionable political and ideological views. See
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1065-67 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that whether mon-
ies allocated to outside organizations, such as PIRGs, in fact trickle down to cam-
pus level is immaterial). In the end, the impact on education of private
organizations outside the campus environs, while visible, represents only a periph-
eral goal of the group whose primary purpose is the furtherance of an ideological
and political agenda. See id. (finding PIRG's educational benefits "incidental").
The reliance on Smith, however, remains puzzling. The Smith court dealt with
the constitutionality of mandatory student activity fees collected by the University
of California at Berkeley that supported on-campus speech. See Smith v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 184 (1993) (noting that University of Cali-
fornia students challenged fees used to support student groups that pursue polit-
ical and ideological causes). In finding for the students, the court broke with well-
established precedent permitting unrestricted on-campus speech. See Schmitz,
supra note 39, at 601 (finding California Supreme Court abandoned traditional
approach to compelled funding cases as they relate to student activity fees); Wig-
gin, supra note 43, at 2010 (stating that Smith decision will "severely diminish stu-
dent speech on issues of public concern at state universities"); Kramer, supra note
43, at 691 (noting that majority's holding drew criticism for its failure, among
other things, to establish meaningful standard to distinguish between "education-
ally beneficial" and "predominantly political" groups). But see Donna M. Cote,
Comment, The First Amendment and Compulsory Funding of Student Government Polit-
ical Resolutions at State Universities, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 825, 854 (1995) (finding that
"student government political resolutions impose a substantial burden on the First
Amendment rights of students whb either disagree with the position taken in a
particular resolution or who wish to remain silent on the issue"). The Southworth
court failed to discuss adequately its motives in using such a controversial state
supreme court decision in its analysis. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726-27 (noting
only that Galda and Smith's conclusions and analyses are more persuasive than
Carroll).
157. But see Louisa Downey, State Senator Pushes Seg Fees Decision, BADGER
HERALD (July 31, 1997) <http://www.badgerherald.com/news/summer97/
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of the court to address adequately the public forum doctrine, a concept
analogous to the Lehnert Court's labor peace criteria, also presents a signif-
icant gap in reasoning.1 5 8 Such a departure is particularly curious in light
of the fact that the public forum doctrine "focuses on the government in
its role as a regulator in the marketplace of ideas" where the government
itself functions as a conduit by which student funding is facilitated. 159 In
addition, several circuits have noted that the public university is a limited
public forum. 160 Finally, the court appears to have ignored the substantial
073197news2.html> (finding free ridership to be potential drawback to proposed
Wisconsin Bill, implementing Southworth holding, because it would allow students
to benefit from projects that they have not paid for, such as free bus pass). Despite
concerns by the ASM, the free rider problem did not affect the realm of bus pass
distribution at the University of Wisconsin. See id. (noting that Wisconsin Bill did
not affect bus pass distribution). The checklist envisioned by the court addressed
political and ideological speech, not bus passes. See generally Southworth, 151 F.3d at
734 (limiting scope of remedy to prohibiting use of objecting students' fees in
support of political and ideological activities).
158. See Waring, supra note 46, at 554 (noting that Smith court's failure to
analyze either party's claims using public forum doctrine presents marked depar-
ture from case law).
159. See id. at 554-55 (finding government's role central to promoting access
to funds necessary for establishing marketplace of ideas on college campuses) (cit-
ing Student Gov't Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1989)).
160. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 n.5 (1981) (finding that
public university campuses possess many characteristics of public forums); Carroll
v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 993 (2d Cir. 1992) (permitting distribution of student
fees for limited purpose of funding activities by campus organization that are edu-
cational, cultural, recreational or social in nature) (citing Galda v. Bloustein, 686
F.2d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1982)); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 477 (4th Cir. 1983)
(finding that University of North Carolina, by publishing student-run paper, fur-
thers state's legitimate interest in creating forum for expression of different view-
points and supporting university as marketplace of ideas); Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 153
(finding that university is not constitutionally prohibited from financing, through
mandatory student fees, programs that provide forum for expression of opinion);
see also Waring, supra note 46, at 560 (noting Second and Fourth Circuits' recent
use of limited public forum doctrine). But see Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 242 (1990) (distinguishing between WidmarCourt's notion of "limited public
forum" and concept of "limited open forum").
The court in Carroll also noted that the university functions as a public forum:
"This fee, a lump sum used to subsidize a variety of student groups, can
be perceived broadly as providing a 'forum' for a diverse range of opin-
ion. . . . Although many student-related groups have ideological over-
tones, to the extent that the university determines that an organization is
an appropriate participant in the total university forum, considerable def-
erence should be accorded that judgment. This deference stems from
the long-standing recognition that the university as a whole functions as a
forum for the exchange of diverse views."
Carroll, 957 F.2d at 1001 (quoting Galda, 686 F.2d at 166); see Kari Thoe, Note, A
Learning Experience: Discovering the Balance Between Fees-Funded Public Fora and Com-
pelled-Speech Rights at American Universities, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1425, 1426 (1998) (not-
ing that Rosenberger decision could be "death knell" for student fees at American
universities).
For a further discussion of the public forum doctrine, see Jeffrey T. Mains,
Note, Constitutional Law-An Airport Terminal Operated by a Public Authority is a Non-
public Forum for Purposes of First Amendment Analysis; Thus, a Ban on Solicitation Need
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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body of Supreme Court jurisprudence that upholds the principle of allo-
cating funding based solely on content-neutral criteria.
16 1
Yet, in the end, the court correctly recognized that failure to protect
students' rights not to associate would infringe upon objecting students'
freedom of speech. 162 Furthermore, the practice of analogizing the
union's goal of promoting labor peace and a university's mission in creat-
ing a marketplace of ideas is neither novel nor without merit. 163 Finally,
although no court has expressly adopted the Lehnert analysis in mandatory
student activity fees cases, the court in Carroll adopted the second prong of
the Lehnert analysis in determining the constitutionality of compulsory
New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG) funding at State Uni-
versity of New York (SUNY) Albany. 164 Although problematic, the South-
Only Satisfy a Reasonableness Standard-International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), 43 DRAKE L. REV. 727 (1995); David A.
Stoll, Comment, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport, Injuring Nine: In-
ternational Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1271
(1993).
161. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840-41
(1995) (finding that funding of campus organizations with student activity fees
must take place on viewpoint-neutral basis and, as such, does not violate Establish-
ment Clause); Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir.
1988) ("[A] public body that chooses to fund speech or expression must do so
evenhandedly, without discriminating among recipients on the basis of their ideol-
ogy."); see also David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 722-31 (1992) (estab-
lishing that universities should be considered "spheres of neutrality" for First
Amendment purposes); Elizabeth E. Gordon, Comment, University Regulation of
Student Speech: Considering Content-Based Criteria Under Public Forum and Subsidy Doc-
trines, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 398-99 (finding that once university decides to
fund certain speech or expression, allocation of monies must take place on con-
tent-neutral basis); Waring, supra note 46, at 564-65 (noting that while state may
refuse to subsidize speech, such decisions must take place in content-neutral con-
text where limited public forum exists).
162. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DuKE L.J. 1, 47 ("A right that cannot be meaningfully exercised is, after all, no
right at all.").
163. See Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1067 (3d Cir. 1985) ("There is room
for argument that a university's role of presenting a variety of ideas is a sufficiently
compelling reason for some infringement of First Amendment rights just as is the
need for labor peace in the union dues cases."). The contention loses some force,
however, when an organization independent of the university and dedicated solely
to one position receives compelled contributions from objecting students. See id.
(noting university's failure to ensure balanced access); see also Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521 (1991) (finding that labor peace is not especially
served by allowing union dues to fund activities unrelated to collective bargain-
ing); Carroll, 957 F.2d at 1001 (finding government's interest in "the promotion of
extracurricular life, the transmission of skills and civic duty, and the stimulation of
energetic campus debate" sufficiently offsets any infringement on students' First
Amendment rights by their compelled funding of NYPIRG).
164. See Carroll, 957 F.2d at 999 (stating task is to determine whether com-
pelled student funding "'promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation'" (quoting United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))). NYPIRG is a statewide, not-for-profit corporation
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worth court's adoption and application of the second Lehnert prong finds
adequate support in case law.
165
The final Lehnert prong, whether compelled funding of private orga-
nizations significantly burdens free speech, requires that the court balance
the university's right to create a marketplace of ideas with the objecting
students' right not to associate. 166 The Supreme Court's analysis in
Lehnert has come under criticism for failing to provide any hard and fast
rules. 167 Particularly, in analyzing whether compelled funding burdens
free speech, the Supreme Court has perpetuated a "give-it-a-try" litigation
based in New York City with chapters on 19 SUNY campuses. See id. at 993
(describing overall structure of NYPIRG). Past on-campus NYPIRG-sponsored
events have included a professor's forum on the arms race, a symposium on wo-
men's health care and a debate between representatives from a presidential cam-
paign. See id. at 994 (describing various on-campus events). Off-campus funding
supports general administrative functions of NYPIRG, newsletters and lobbying ef-
forts. See id. (describing various off-campus events).
Every two years, students decide via referendum whether to fund NYPIRG. See
id. (discussing referendum). Traditionally, students have approved such funding.
See id. All students then become members of the organization regardless of indi-
vidual consent. See id. at 995 (noting mandatory membership requirement).
Although NYPIRG describes itself as a nonpartisan research and advocacy organi-
zation, the court recognized that NYPIRG programs inevitably affect political and
social action. See id. at 994-95 ("I think you can sort of assume that.., without any
dispute [NYPIRGI does have a program for affecting political and social action.").
165. See Waring, supra note 46, at 546 (finding ability to balance aggregate
societal goals produced by marketplace of ideas paradoxical to goal of safeguard-
ing individual autonomy). One commentator pointed out that in both Galda and
Smith, the courts found that the right of some student organizations to obtain gov-
ernment subsidies was insufficient compared to fee payers' right not to subsidize
objectionable speech. See id. at 546 n.32 (noting paradox created in conflicting
interests).
166. See Galda, 772 F.2d at 1067 (finding that in situations where outside orga-
nizations dedicated to advancement of single issue receive compelled fees, "[the]
university's ability to insure a balance in access is infringed.., and the quid pro
quo for a payment to a forum disappears"); see also Paul Cellupica, Recent Develop-
ments, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 731, 735 (1986) ("The inside-outside distinction
created the best way to rule for the plaintiffs while limiting, as much as possible,
future judicial intervention into the affairs of public universities."); Waring, supra
note 46, at 575-76 ("In the case of PIRG, however, the court emphasized that the
University has an obligation 'to insure a balance in access' to the forum, and 'an
outside organization independent of a university and dedicated to advancing one
position' infringes on that balance." (quoting Galda, 772 F.2d at 1067)).
167. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 551 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (finding each prong of test "involves a substantial judgment call"); see also
Calvin Siemer, Comment, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n: Accounting to Financial
Core Members: Much A-Dues About Nothing?, 60 FoRDnAM L. REv. 1057, 1074 (1992)
(discussing flaws identified by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Lehnert and Court's
failure to answer unresolved questions in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988)). Justice Scalia suggested that the Court adopt the following rule: "A
union cannot constitutionally charge nonmembers for any expenses except those
incurred for the conduct of activities in which the union owes a duty of fair repre-
sentation to the nonmembers being charged." Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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test certain to bog down the courts because of its reliance on an imprecise
balancing test.
168
Despite the scholarly and judicial attacks on the Lehnert analysis, the
court in Southworth properly integrated the third prong of the analysis into
its reasoning. 169 In so doing, the Southworth court acknowledged that
while "hateful speech has a place in our society," the Constitution does not
mandate that citizens pay for such speech. 170 Since the time of the Fram-
ers, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]o compel [an individual]
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions that he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." 171 In sum, the court set forth sound,
well-accepted grounds for applying the Lehnert standard to the facts in
Southworth. 1
72
The court's decision, aside from the analytical problems mentioned
above, creates a myriad of enforcement difficulties. First, the court failed
to define what constitutes a constitutionally valid manner for the State Re-
gents to pro rate student fees to reflect only that portion of the student
activity fee for which the students agree to pay. 173 Second, the court de-
clined to adopt adequate safeguards to prevent the administrative
168. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 551 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (finding test provides little guidance and does not eliminate confusion).
169. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 729 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that
"'an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view"' is
unacceptable burden on free speech (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
715 (1977))), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999).
170. See id. (acknowledging that government need not subsidize protected
speech); see also Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46
(1983) (recognizing that person's First Amendment rights are not violated because
government chooses not to subsidize speech); Southworth, 151 F.3d at 730 ("'[I] t is
error alone which needs the support of government. Truth can stand for itself."'
(quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NoTEs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 233 (2d Amer. ed.
1794))); cf Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1997)
(noting that requiring growers and handlers of California tree fruits to pay assess-
ments subsidizing generic advertising does not "engender any crisis of
conscience").
171. BRANT, supra note 29, at 354.
172. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 731 (finding that compelling students to pay
for objectionable speech strikes at heart of First Amendment's notion that "'an
individual should be free to believe as he will"' (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977))). The Southworth court concluded its analysis
of the third prong of the Lehnert standard by stating:
In essence, allowing the compelled funding in this case would undermine
any right to "freedom of belief." We would be saying that students like
the plaintiffs are free to believe what they wish, but they still must fund
organizations espousing beliefs they reject. Thus, while they have the
right to believe what they choose, they nevertheless must fund what they
don't believe.
Id. In a sense, the court could not find for the university without creating an un-
tenable burden on free speech and association. See id. (finding that requiring stu-
dents to pay mandatory student activity fees creates "a crisis of conscience").
173. See Schmitz, supra note 39, at 639 (suggesting Smith court adopt three-
part solution found in Hudson). One commentator has suggested the adoption of
the following three-prong Hudson method of pro-rata fee reimbursement:
1999] NOTE
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nightmare created by permitting students to make a checklist of organiza-
tions they do not wish to support. 174 Third and finally, the court did not
consider how, in the aftermath of the Southworth decision, it would handle
the multitude of ensuing constitutional challenges by groups who receive
reduced funding.
175
(1) absolute precision in fee calculation cannot be expected or required;
(2) it would be acceptable for the university to base its fee calculation on
previous year expenses; and (3) an adequate disclosure of expenses to
dissenters would include the major expense categories and be verified by
an independent auditor.
Id. (citing Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307 n.18 (1986)).
Even so, there exists a lack of flexibility, or perhaps too much oversight, in a system
protectively micro-managing and guarding each funding decision from potential
First Amendment intrusions. See id. at 641 (discussing difficulty in calculating ap-
propriate amount to deduct from mandatory fees). See generally Ellis v. Brother-
hood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 452 (1984) (finding that it is not
always easy to pro rate expenses properly incurred by union as collective bargain-
ing representative with those involving political action). The Southworth court rec-
ognized that any attempt to earmark certain funds represented "merely a
bookkeeping matter, with the end result being that the objecting student subsi-
dizes the political and ideological activities of the organization." Southworth, 151
F.3d at 732.
174. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 440 (noting Ninth Circuit affirmed district court
order requiring that protesting employees' annual dues be reduced by amount
spent in preceding year on activities deemed objectionable); Abood, 431 U.S. at 237
(declining to mandate specific procedures and instead permitting parties to devise
way of "preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity ... without re-
stricting the Union's . . . collective bargaining activities," such as permitting dis-
senters to indicate that they opposed any ideological expenditure unrelated to
collective bargaining); Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1066 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The
courts have observed that it is not always easy to prorate the expenses properly
incurred by a union as collective bargaining representative with those involving
political action."); see also Schmitz, supra note 39, at 636-37 (noting that Smith
court's recommendation that University of California adopt voluntary funding sys-
tem would turn student activity fee system into popularity contest subject to wealth
of individual members); Cusac, supra note 3, at 30 (noting "practical impossibility"
and "formidable arithmetic" inherent in creating system whereby 39,826 University
of Wisconsin students select which of 200 campus groups should receive their por-
tion of student fees).
An opt-out system of payment as it pertains to private special interest groups is
not totally unfeasible. See generally International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 771-75 (1961) (describing various remedies available to union). For ex-
ample, the University of Illinois permits students to withhold $7 per semester that
would otherwise go directly to special interest groups. See Dave Newbart, College
Student Fees Face Ist Amendment Test, CHICAGO TRIB., June 4, 1997, at 1 (describing
opt-out mechanism at University of Illinois). The students may, however, lose ac-
cess to student services, such as the student legal center. See id. (discussing loss of
privileges under opt-out scheme).
175. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732 (recognizing that leaving dispersal of
funds to democratic process of student government is inadequate because First
Amendment trumps democratic process and protects individual rights "even when
a majority of citizens wants to infringe upon them").
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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The question presented in Southworth has narrowed the mandatory
student activity fee controversy to a discreet and manageable issue.1 76 The
issues of the disturbing and sweeping consequences of prohibiting the col-
lection of student activity fees and the potential extinguishing of free
speech on public university campuses are no longer before the courts.
177
Nevertheless, there is evidence that future holdings in line with Southworth
may signify the beginning of a right-wing Christian movement towards sup-
pression of objectionable speech. 178 In fact, the immediate impact of
176. For a discussion of the precise question presented in Southworth, see
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
177. SeeSmith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 184 (1993)
(finding that use of mandatory fees to fund political or ideological student groups
at public universities violates First Amendment). The court in Smith dealt with an
uncomfortably broad issue, containing rather sweeping policy ramifications. For a
further discussion of the Smith decision, see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying
text. In contrast, the Southworth court addressed an identifiable group of students
who objected to a specific facet of monetary allocation: the funding of the ideolog-
ical agendas of private organizations outside the campus walls. See Southworth, 151
F.3d at 722 (challenging only funds used to promote private political and ideologi-
cal activities). Note also that the ruling in Southworth does not affect private univer-
sities. See Newbart, supra note 174, at 1 (stating that private universities remain
unaffected by court's ruling).
178. See Cusac, supra note 3, at 30 (describing Southworth suit as "the pet pro-
ject of a little-known legal outfit of the Christian right, the Alliance Defense Fund,"
as part of general effort "to reclaim legal ground in this country for the body of
Christ"); see also Monday Q & A: Christian Tells Why He Took UW to Court, CAPITAL
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at 2A (discussing role of Alliance Defense Fund in assisting
Scott Southworth's claim against Regents to recover student activity fees that
funded objectionable campus speech); Samir Murty, Seg Fees Not Easy Issue, Decision
to Destroy Diversity, BADGER HERALD (Sept. 14, 1998) <http://www.badgerherald.
com/news/fal198/o91498opinionl.html> (discussing potential threat to quality of
education on campus in light of Southworth decision and lamenting potential for
long run undoing of entire segregated fee system at University of Wisconsin and
across nation).
The Alliance Defense Fund is a self-described grass roots Christian organiza-
tion intent on "reclaiming legal ground in this country for the body of Christ."
Cusac, supra note 3, at 30. The Alliance Defense Fund was formed in January 1994
to identify strategic, precedent-setting suits beneficial to the Christian right. See id.
(discussing founding purpose of Alliance Defense Fund). As one of their projects,
the Alliance Defense Fund allocated $35,000 towards Scott Southworth's fight
against the University of Wisconsin Regents. See id. (discussing Alliance Defense
Fund's role in Southworth suit).
The Alliance Defense Fund receives backing from "the heaviest hitters in
Christian rightdom," including James Dobson of Focus on the Family, Gary Bauer
of the Family Research Council, Don Wildmon of the American Family Association
and Alan Sears (the Alliance Defense Fund's president) who served as executive
director of United States Attorney General Edwin Meese's 1985-86 Commission on
Pornography. See id. (describing notable Alliance Defense Fund leaders). To date,
the Alliance Defense Fund has tallied 47 wins and only 6 losses. See id. The Alli-
ance Defense Fund's president, Alan Sears, stated that the Southworth decision al-
lowed for "a lot of spinoff" where "[h]igh schools may be the next logical step." Id.
Whether this represents the beginning of the abolition of church and state separa-
tion or the beginning of the end for public schools remains more suspect. See id.
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Southworth may be the suppression of liberal speech and the bolstering of
conservative thought.
179
While the ideal of the campus as a marketplace of ideas may be a
nostalgic notion, even today, organizations such as the Alliance Defense
Fund understand that the struggle to control access to this marketplace of
ideas remains important.1 80 Such groups realize that a frontal attack on
mandatory student activity fees flies in the face of several decades of
Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing the campus as a marketplace
of ideas. 181 Although attacking private organizations funded by the
university represents a roundabout method by which to attack liberal
causes, evidence suggests that such tactics may prove effective. 18 2 For
(noting that decisions such as Southworth represent significant erosion of First
Amendment sanctity).
Finally, the Alliance Defense Fund summed up in their organizational newslet-
ter the group's true intentions in the wake of Rosenberger (another Alliance Defense
Fund case): "We also have begun to select key cases that would build on this foun-
dation and to look for other cases that will create additional key precedents in our
quest for true religious freedom in America." Id.
179. See Cusac, supra note 3, at 30 (finding that traditionally under-
represented groups such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center would be pri-
mary targets of opt-out system); Newbart, supra note 174, at 1 (finding that
curtailment in funding "could lead to the death of controversial or unpopular
groups on college campuses, and eventually hurt the schools' ability to foster a
diverse environment").
180. See Waring, supra note 46, at 545-47 (discussing usefulness of market-
place metaphor in discussing student fees cases). One scholar posits three ways in
which the marketplace metaphor remains helpful. See id. (positing three ways in
which marketplace metaphor remains helpful). First, given that values in the mar-
ketplace are generally accepted as true, the struggle to control access to the mar-
ketplace of ideas remains important for those ideas that have economic and
political ramifications. See id. (recognizing that marketplace metaphor remains
helpful despite passage of time); see also Ingber, supra note 162, at 26 ("[A] person
will perceive the marketplace as leading to the best result only if it favors those
who, in that specific individual's view, should be favored."). Second, courts have
used the marketplace model to explicate the paradox between promoting free ex-
pression as a means of benefiting society as a whole and the conflict over individ-
ual autonomy. See Waring, supra note 46, at 545-46 (focusing on conflict between
promoting aggregate and individual benefits to society). Third and finally, one
author discussed the relevancy of laissez-faire policy in United States jurisprudence
as it pertains to the government's tendency to regulate, or not to regulate, ideas in
the free marketplace. See id. at 547 (discussing effect of regulation on free market-
place of ideas).
181. See Southwarth, 151 F.3d at 721 (finding that students challenged only
narrow portion of allocable fees); see also Cusac, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing
Scott Southworth's previously unsuccessful attempts to sabotage student fees distri-
bution mechanism by, among other things, trying to dissolve entire University of
Wisconsin student government). For a further discussion of the narrow issue
presented in Southworth, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
182. See Cusac, supra note 3, at 30 (noting Scott Southworth's statement that
Southworth decision "definitely sent some shock waves through the educational
community"). Lack of funding of state PIRG organizations from student fees may
cause substantial financial hardship. See Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1062 (3d
Cir. 1985) (noting that NJPIRG collected nearly $800,000 from mandatory student
activity fees over 12-year period); see also Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 994 (2d
[Vol. 44: p. 257
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1999] NOTE
the Alliance Defense Fund, such victories represent only the begin-
ning.
183
Underlying all of the above questions is an even broader public policy
concern. First, in an effort to promote judicial economy and not burden
the courts with unnecessary pro rata fee litigation, future courts will most
likely delegate such details to the individual states.1 8 4 Consequently, state
legislatures will be left with the onerous responsibility of designing statutes
in compliance with vague judicial holdings.1 8 5 In addition, courts have
recognized that to uphold the principles of federalism, the states them-
selves should have the sole power to regulate allocations of State Regents'
funds.186
Cir. 1992) (noting that 30% of NYPIRG's $2.7 million budget comes from campus
activity fees in SUNY system); Christopher Downey, First Amendment: SUNY Albany
Student Fee Contribution to NYPIRG is Not Forced Speech, but NYPIRG May Not Count All
Students as Members, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 5 (discussing Carroll decision);
Deborah Pines, NYPIRG Held Entitled to SUNY Student Fees-Court Finds No Constitu-
tional Violation, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1992, at 1 (discussing holding in Carroll permit-
ting dispersal of funds to NYPIRGs so long as NYPIRG spends monies collected
from student fees on campus in which they were raised).
183. See Cusac, supra note 3, at 30 (indicating Alliance Defense Fund's larger
agenda targets entire public school system and even doctrine of separation of
church and state).
184. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 734 (noting that protracted federal judicial
supervision should be reserved only for "'extreme cases of demonstrated noncom-
pliance"' (quoting ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 798 (7th Cir. 1995))).
185. See id. (finding that injunction set forth by court requires Regents,
through state legislative action, to take detailed measures to ensure that students'
First Amendment rights are not curtailed). Because the Constitution does not
mandate a specific remedy in enjoining the Regents from funding certain student
programs, the court found that it is the legislature's place and not that of the
courts to implement appropriate measures to safeguard First Amendment rights.
See id. at 735 (considering policies of federalism).
The State of Wisconsin's Senate, in the wake of the district court's initial deci-
sion in Southworth, proposed several pieces of legislation to comply with the court's
injunction. The proposed bill, section 36.11(27), reads: "Segregated fees. The
board may not approve any fee for the support of a student organization whose
educational benefits are incidental to its primary purpose of advancing a political
or ideological cause unless it exempts from payment of the fee any student who
objects to supporting the organization." S.B. 134, 93d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1997).
The statute went into effect the first fall semester after its enactment. See id. (ad-
dressing implementation deadline for statute); see also Downey, supra note 182, at I
(discussing proposed Wisconsin bill addressing court's decision in Southworth).
186. See Consumer Party v. Davis, 778 F.2d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 1985)
("'[Flederal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs ....'" (quoting Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977))); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362-63
(1996) (finding that injunctive relief against state should be no broader than is
necessary to remedy constitutional violation); Clark v. Coye, 60 F.3d 600, 604 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding that injunctive remedy "protects the plaintiffs' federal constitu-
tional and statutory rights but does not require more of state officials than is neces-
sary to assure their compliance with federal law"); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d
1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[I] njunctive restraints that exceed constitutional min-
ima must be narrowly tailored to prevent repetition of proved constitutional viola-
tions, and must not intrude unnecessarily on state functions.") (citing Ruiz v.
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It remains to be seen whether the courts' passing the buck under the
guise of federalism and judicial restraint will in turn cause a judicial quag-
mire.18 7 In conclusion, it is uncertain whether the Southworth court's
break from prior jurisprudence, with its decision favoring objecting stu-
dents, presents a realistic possibility that the campus soap boxes of yester-
year will begin to gather cobwebs.1 88
Matthew L Weinstein
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1156 (5th Cir.), amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1982)). The court in Southworth adopted the above decisions as guide-
lines for the legislature in fashioning remedies for education. See Southworth, 151
F.3d at 734-35 (finding that state legislature should retain control of fee allocation
because Constitution does not mandate exact injunctive procedure to be used in
such student funding cases and because Wisconsin has not refused to comply).
187. SeeJon Segal, Students Say UWFee Panel is Unfair, CAPITAL TIMES, Sept. 18,
1998, at 2A (finding administrators and students in deadlock over how to dis-
tribute student activity fees in light of court's decision in Southworth). Whereas the
students point to Wisconsin State Code section 39.09(5), the University has at-
tempted to wrestle control from the students by taking a majority of voting seats on
the allocation committee. See id. (noting that statute gives students control of "the
formulation and review of policies concerning student life, services and interests");
see also Nathan Arnold, Lyall Stands by a Split Student Fees Committee, BADGER HERALD
(Sept. 18,1998) <http://www.badgerherald.com/news/fal198/091898news2.html>
(discussing new student fee committee designed by University of Wisconsin Presi-
dent Katherine Lyall).
With all the debate surrounding the constitutionality of student fee allocation,
another round of lawsuits designed to determine the role of student input in fee
dissemination may clutter the court dockets, creating an unacceptable standstill.
See id. (stating that students such as Eric Brakken, Chairperson of ASM, will not
bow to university pressure in light of Southworth).
188. See Schmitz, supra note 39, at 634 (finding that court's decision in Smith
threatened university's discretionary power to determine best way to carry out its
educational purpose). One commentator posited that "[i]nstead of carrying out
its statutory mandate subject to judicial oversight of educational decisions, the uni-
versity will potentially find itself inhibiting speech in order to avoid potential litiga-
tion costs." Id. at 635.
While Smith presents the most significant break from priorjurisprudence inso-
far as the curtailment of on-campus speech is concerned, prohibition of funding
off-campus private organizations received judicial approval as early as 1985. See
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1068 (3d Cir. 1985) (enjoining assessment of
mandatory student activity fees payable to NJPIRG). Nevertheless, the Galda
court's deeply divided ruling demonstrates courts' hesitancy towards curtailment
of subsidization even in reference to private organizations outside the campus
walls. See id. (Adams,J., dissenting) (finding "a determination that speech is polit-
ical or that a university's decision is unwise" does not lead to conclusion "that an
outlet for campus speech is unconstitutional and must be foreclosed"); see also Car-
roll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 1003 (2d Cir. 1992) (permitting funding of NYPIRG
using student activity fees, but eliminating practice of automatic membership);
Cusac, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting University's position that "[t]he danger in ac-
cepting the plaintiffs' position is that it may not be long before all student ideologi-
cal expression funded by fees is silenced").
296
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